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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with two related issues: the 
sustainability of China’s exchange rate regime 
and the opening up of its capital account. The 
exchange rate discussion deliberately passes 
over the issue of the “equilibrium” value of 
the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation – 
typically at the heart of the current policy 
debate – and focuses instead on the domestic 
costs of the current regime and the potential risks 
to domestic ﬁ  nancial stability in the long run. 
The paper argues that the renminbi exchange rate 
should be increasingly determined by market 
forces and that administrative controls should 
be progressively relinquished. The exchange 
rate is obviously linked to well-functioning 
and efﬁ   cient capital markets, which require 
no barriers to capital ﬂ   ows. Thus, exchange 
rate reform has to be correctly sequenced with 
reform of the capital account to avoid disruptive 
capital ﬂ  ows. The paper discusses China’s twin 
surpluses of the current and capital accounts 
and attempts to identify the drivers of this 
“anomalous” external position. The pragmatic 
strategy pursued by the Chinese authorities in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis encouraged FDI 
inﬂ  ows and favoured the accumulation of a large 
stock of foreign exchange reserves. Combined 
with a relatively weak institutional setting, these 
factors have been important determinants of the 
pattern and composition of the country’s capital 
ﬂ   ows and international investment position. 
Finally, the paper speculates on the outlook for 
Chinese capital ﬂ  ows should barriers to capital 
movements be lifted. It argues that whether 
China continues to supply capital to the rest of 
the world or eventually becomes a net borrower 
in international capital markets – as was the case 
for most of its recent history – will depend on 
the evolution of its institutions.
Keywords: China; exchange rate policy; 
international investment position; capital 
account liberalisation; institutions.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: F10; F21; F31; F32; P48.5
ECB




China’s economic performance over the 
past quarter of a century has been one of the 
strongest in history. Following years of rapid 
expansion, China has become one of the world’s 
largest economies, a key global exporter and an 
important trading partner for many developed 
and developing economies. It has also been a 
large recipient of foreign investment for some 
time and, recently, it emerged as a leading 
investor in global ﬁ  nancial markets. Alongside 
the obvious domestic and global beneﬁ  ts, this 
rapid expansion has brought about a number 
of policy challenges, and structural imbalances 
have emerged both internally and externally. 
Currently, these imbalances relate to the risks 
of abundant liquidity, overcapacity in some 
industries and external surpluses, and appear 
linked – among other factors – to the tightly 
managed exchange rate regime, which hinders 
the effectiveness of monetary policy and diverts 
it from domestic objectives.
This paper takes a fresh look at China’s exchange 
rate regime and links it to the ongoing debate 
about the liberalisation of the capital account. 
The exchange rate discussion deliberately 
passes over the issue of the “equilibrium” value 
of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation – 
typically at the heart of the current policy 
debate – and focuses instead on the desirability 
of the current regime from a domestic viewpoint 
and its sustainability in the long run. Thus, the 
focus is shifted from external equilibrium and 
balance of payment adjustment to domestic 
imbalances and the potential implications for 
ﬁ  nancial stability. The main argument of this 
paper is that the current exchange rate regime 
exacts high welfare costs from different sectors 
of the Chinese economy and poses long-term 
risks to ﬁ  nancial stability. The Chinese economy 
would be better served by an independent 
monetary policy geared towards domestic 
objectives. Monetary independence requires 
exchange rate ﬂ   exibility – not necessarily a 
revaluation.
Exchange rate ﬂ  exibility is obviously linked to 
well-functioning and efﬁ  cient capital markets, 
which entail no barriers to capital ﬂ  ows. Thus, 
exchange rate reform has to be correctly 
sequenced with reform of the capital account 
to avoid disruptive capital ﬂ  ows.  Contrary 
to the predictions of the neoclassical theory, 
according to which a country with a low capital-
to-labour ratio should borrow net capital from 
abroad, China is in fact a net supplier of capital 
to the rest of the world. Institutions have been 
an important determinant of the pattern and 
composition of the country’s capital ﬂ  ows and 
i.i.p. Institutions are endogenous to society and 
reﬂ  ect tensions among different interest groups 
with possibly conﬂ   icting goals. Ultimately, 
reforms of the exchange rate regime and the 
capital account will depend on which interest 
group eventually prevails in Chinese society.
Methodologically, the arguments proposed in 
this paper are based on clues and hints gathered 
from a variety of sources, which ﬁ  t together in 
much the same way as a large jigsaw puzzle. 
As the evidence mounts, the picture becomes 
clearer and a reasoned judgement can be made. 
Under China’s de facto pegged exchange rate 
regime, domestic policies are oriented to the 
achievement of an external target. This implies 
a cost in terms of loss of control over domestic 
monetary policy: liquidity expands and contracts 
to preserve the foreign exchange rate of the 
domestic currency vis-à-vis the anchor currency, 
thus making it more difﬁ   cult for monetary 
policy to address price stability and/or activity 
objectives.
The People’s Bank of China – China’s central 
bank – has conducted large-scale open market 
operations in order to partially sterilise the 
domestic monetary expansion caused by foreign 
exchange intervention. However, sterilisation 
entails costs and risks, which are likely to 
increase more than proportionally as the stock 
of reserves increases. These costs may not be 
fully acknowledged on the balance sheet of 
the central bank. Furthermore, the policy of 
sterilised intervention has helped to generate a 
liquidity overhang in the ﬁ  nancial system and a 6
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credit boom. This, in turn, is partly responsible 
for the economic overheating and the build-up 
of excessive capacity in some sectors. In the 
long run, over-capacity can generate deﬂ  ation 
and recession, which negatively affect corporate 
sector proﬁ  tability and its capacity to service 
debt. Rising non-performing loans undermine 
the banking system and may ultimately 
threaten  ﬁ  nancial stability – although there is 
no evidence that this is currently happening in 
China. Moreover, the People’s Bank of China 
needs to maintain a relatively loose monetary 
stance (i.e. low domestic real interest rates) in 
order to deter inﬂ  ows of “hot money” that would 
add to exchange rate pressure. To achieve this, 
the authorities have implemented administrative 
controls on bank lending, which in turn create 
distortions and efﬁ   ciency losses. Eventually, 
prolonged and large-scale foreign exchange 
intervention could also affect domestic ﬁ  nancial 
stability. Chinese banks are investing increasing 
shares of the liquidity ﬂ   owing from foreign 
exchange interventions into low-yielding PBC 
sterilisation bonds. At the same time, deposit 
liabilities are growing quickly and demanding 
a higher rate than bond yields. This may have 
negative implications for bank proﬁ  tability and 
net interest income.
A  ﬂ   exible exchange rate regime and, by 
extension, an independent monetary policy 
might forestall these costs and risks. However, 
such a regime requires a fully convertible capital 
account. To discuss reform options, this paper 
identiﬁ  es the key features of China’s balance of 
payments and international investment position: 
a relatively low level of ﬁ  nancial  integration 
with the global economy, which has lagged 
behind trade integration; a large net foreign asset 
position, which is difﬁ  cult to reconcile with the 
country’s relative factor endowment and level 
of development; the absolute predominance of 
foreign exchange reserves – and symmetrically 
the relatively small weight of non-reserve assets – 
in total foreign assets, which ultimately implies 
a concentration of foreign asset ownership in the 
public sector (government, state-owned banks 
and enterprises); the prevalence of FDI in gross 
foreign liabilities and the relatively low stock of 
external debt, particularly short-term debt; and 
a signiﬁ  cant amount of unrecorded assets held 
abroad by Chinese residents.
Several factors may explain the direction 
and composition of China’s capital ﬂ  ows, 
including the adoption of an “open-door” 
policy to foreign investment (particularly 
FDI), the pragmatic strategy that prevailed in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis and the focus 
on reserve accumulation for precautionary 
purposes. This paper concentrates, in particular, 
on the vast literature on institutions. According 
to this literature, institutions, which are a 
complementary input of capital and labour in 
production, are endogenous to society and are 
the outcome of tensions among different interest 
groups whose goals may conﬂ   ict with one 
another. Thus, institutions change over time, 
reshaping the economic landscape of a country. 
This paper speculates that if the ongoing 
reform effort leads to an improvement in local 
institutions in China, fostering the protection of 
property rights and the presence and perfection 
of markets, the accumulation of foreign reserves 
may come to an end, FDI may cease to be the 
dominant component in foreign liabilities and 
China may even become a net borrower in 
international capital markets. Understandably, 
the process will take time and the ﬁ  nal outcome 
will depend on which group in Chinese society 
eventually prevails.7
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1 INTRODUCTION
China’s economic performance over the past 
quarter of a century has been one of the strongest 
in history. Following years of rapid expansion, 
the country has climbed from being the eleventh 
largest economy in the world in 1990 – as 
measured in US dollars at current exchange 
rates – to the fourth largest in 2006 (the second 
largest if adjustments are made for differences 
in purchasing power). In only 15 years, real 
GDP per capita increased from being roughly 
comparable to that of India – another economy 
to have experienced above-average growth over 
the period – to almost three times that ﬁ  gure in 
2006. China has also become one of the world’s 
largest exporters and a key trading partner of 
many developed and developing economies. 
It has been an important destination of foreign 
investment for a long time, absorbing around 
20% of total FDI ﬂ  ows to emerging economies 
in 2006, and recently it has emerged as a leading 
investor in global ﬁ  nancial markets.
Together with domestic and global beneﬁ  ts, 
China’s rapid expansion has brought about 
a number of policy challenges, with the 
emergence of both internal and external 
structural imbalances. In the authorities’ own 
admission, reserve accumulation – although 
partly sterilised – has been one of the main 
drivers of abundant liquidity and above-target 
credit growth in the economy. This has led 
to risks of overheating. CPI inﬂ  ation,  which 
so far has remained contained on account of 
the low propensity to consume and moderate 
wage dynamics, has been on a clear upward 
trend since mid-2006. There have also been 
signs of overinvestment in certain sectors of 
the economy. These imbalances appear linked, 
among other factors, to the tightly managed 
exchange rate regime, which places a constraint 
on monetary policy and diverts it from domestic 
objectives.
Under the current de facto pegged exchange 
rate regime, domestic policies are oriented to 
achieve an external target. This implies a cost 
in terms of the loss of control over domestic 
monetary policy: liquidity expands and 
contracts to preserve the foreign exchange rate 
of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the anchor 
currency, thus making it more difﬁ  cult  for 
monetary policy to address price stability and/or 
activity objectives. Moreover, the central bank 
maintains low domestic real interest rates also 
in order to deter excess inﬂ  ows of “hot money” 
from abroad, which would add to exchange 
rate pressure. As a result, the authorities have 
to implement administrative controls on bank 
lending, which in turn create distortions and 
efﬁ  ciency losses.
This paper reviews these issues, focusing 
on two related topics: the sustainability of 
China’s exchange rate regime and the opening 
up of the capital account. The exchange rate 
discussion deliberately passes over the issue of 
the “equilibrium” value of the renminbi and its 
alleged undervaluation – typically at the heart of 
the current policy debate – and focuses instead 
on the desirability of the current regime from 
a domestic viewpoint and its sustainability in 
the long run. Thus, the focus is shifted from 
external equilibrium and balance of payment 
adjustment to domestic imbalances and the 
potential implications for ﬁ  nancial  stability. 
Methodologically, the line of argument draws 
on clues and hints gathered from a variety of 
sources, which ﬁ  t together much like a large 
jigsaw puzzle. As with the puzzle, a clear 
picture emerges only after all the evidence has 
been examined and pieced together.
The main argument of this paper is that the 
current exchange rate regime exacts high 
welfare costs from different sectors of the 
Chinese economy and poses long-term risks 
to  ﬁ  nancial stability. China’s economy would 
be better served by an independent monetary 
policy geared towards domestic objectives. 
Monetary independence requires exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility – not necessarily a revaluation. 
Exchange rate ﬂ  exibility is obviously linked to 
well-functioning and efﬁ  cient capital markets, 
which entail no barriers to capital ﬂ  ows. Thus, 
exchange rate reform has to be correctly 
sequenced with reform of the capital account to 8
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avoid disruptive capital ﬂ  ows. Institutions have 
been an important determinant of the pattern and 
composition of the country’s capital ﬂ  ows and 
international investment position. Institutions 
are endogenous to society and reﬂ  ect tensions 
among different interest groups with possibly 
conﬂ  icting goals. Therefore, any reform of the 
exchange rate regime and further progress in 
capital account liberalisation will ultimately 
depend on which interest group eventually 
prevails in Chinese society.
* * *
Historically, the renminbi’s peg to the US dollar 
has been an important element of the stabilisation 
policies pursued in recent decades. Together 
with other structural reforms that have opened 
up the Chinese economy to competition and 
liberalised price-setting mechanisms for most 
goods and services, the peg has successfully 
helped to stabilise inﬂ  ation. Whether it has also 
promoted external trade in the context of China’s 
so-called “export-led” growth model is still 
open to debate. Structural factors affecting the 
intertemporal choices of consumption, saving 
and investment have been key determinants 
of China’s widening trade surplus and of its 
“anomalous” external position.
More recently, mounting evidence suggests 
that it has become increasingly challenging to 
maintain the renminbi’s hard peg to the US dollar. 
The policy of sterilised intervention consistently 
pursued by the central bank in recent years, 
which in turn has been responsible for the rapid 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, has 
fuelled strong liquidity growth in the ﬁ  nancial 
system and a credit boom. This, in turn, has been 
partly responsible for the economic overheating 
and the build-up of excessive capacity in some 
sectors. Overcapacity entails a risk of deﬂ  ation 
and recession in the long run, with implications 
for corporate sector proﬁ  tability and its ability to 
service debt. Rising non-performing loans may 
undermine the banking system and ultimately 
threaten  ﬁ   nancial stability, although there is 
only fragmented and inconclusive evidence 
as to whether this chain of events is actually 
unfolding at the current juncture in China.
Sterilisation also entails some costs. So far, 
the direct costs have been negligible since the 
yields of the main sterilisation instruments have 
been lower than the interest rates on medium 
and long-term US government bonds, which is 
where a large part of China’s ofﬁ  cial reserves 
is likely to have been invested. However, 
lending controls, combined with strong deposit 
growth, generate a liquidity overhang in the 
banking system, which largely fuels the demand 
for sterilisation bills. On several occasions, 
strong demand for sterilisation instruments 
pushed their yields below the rates that banks 
pay on deposits, raising concerns over bank 
proﬁ   tability. Furthermore, the true cost of 
sterilisation is partly transferred off the balance 
sheet of the central bank and onto the balance 
sheet of the banking system.
In addition to the long-term risks to ﬁ  nancial 
stability, the peg also poses a policy dilemma 
for the Chinese policy-maker, highlighted by 
portfolio equilibrium considerations based on the 
UIP condition. At the current juncture, relatively 
high interest rates would be needed to cool down 
the rapid growth of economy activity. However, 
high interest rates and the expectation of an 
exchange rate appreciation attract speculative 
capital inﬂ   ows, which in turn exacerbate the 
liquidity overhang and foster economic activity. 
The paradox is that the relatively loose monetary 
stance that is required to keep the appreciation 
pressures on the exchange rate in check in fact 
contributes to further stimulate the overheated 
economy.
Thus, this paper makes a strong argument 
for an early move towards greater exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility, abstracting from the debate on 
renminbi undervaluation. The focus is shifted 
from balance of payment adjustment to domestic 
imbalances and the risks to ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Exchange rate ﬂ   exibility is in China’s own 
interest. As the economy develops and becomes 
increasingly integrated with the rest of the 9
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I   INTRODUCTION
world, it will become inevitably more exposed 
to different types of macroeconomic shocks, 
both internally and externally. Exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility and, by extension, a more independent 
monetary policy would help the economy cope 
better with such shocks. This is the main reason 
why the determination of the exchange rate in 
China should be left increasingly to market 
forces. A corollary of this argument is that, in 
the long run, it is a move towards ﬂ  exibility – 
not necessarily a revaluation – that is desirable.
The issue of the exchange rate is closely 
linked to the reform of the capital account. The 
importance of a correct sequencing of capital 
account reform and foreign exchange market 
liberalisation has already been discussed at 
some length in the literature. The value added 
of this paper is to point out that exchange rate 
reform and capital account liberalisation have to 
be accompanied by domestic reforms that aim 
to ensure the full protection of property rights, 
address the ongoing weaknesses in the banking 
system, promote deeper ﬁ  nancial markets and 
improve corporate governance.
Currently, a move towards capital account 
liberalisation, combined with a pegged currency, 
would lead to large speculative capital inﬂ  ows, 
given expectations of a strong renminbi 
appreciation. Moreover, there might be a risk 
that the corporate and banking sectors would 
overborrow from abroad. These concerns could 
be addressed by allowing greater exchange rate 
ﬂ   exibility and a gradual appreciation of the 
renminbi. Sudden shifts and overshooting would 
thus be avoided. A new, credible, equilibrium 
level of the exchange rate could be found and 
uncertainty around this central parity would have 
to be created to discourage speculative capital 
inﬂ  ows. At the same time, the partial opening of 
the capital account would be envisaged, while 
some restrictions on capital mobility would 
remain. Even if exchange markets were (partially) 
liberalised, effective capital controls would 
prevent an abrupt adjustment in the domestic 
currency and discourage inﬂ  ows of hot money 
into China. If investors are conﬁ   dent that the 
currency will appreciate over time, they will buy 
assets denominated in that currency and cash in 
the proﬁ  ts generated by the appreciation. As long 
as security markets remain narrow and shallow, 
property rights not fully protected, the banking 
system weak and lacking adequate hedging 
instruments, the adoption of a completely free-
ﬂ   oating exchange rate is premature in China. 
However, a re-pegging at a higher rate does not 
represent a sustainable solution in the long run, 
as it would only postpone the ﬁ  nancial stability 
concerns that are currently associated with the 
peg and not deliver the independent monetary 
policy that domestic considerations call for.
A  ﬂ   exible exchange rate regime requires a 
liberalised capital account. To discuss reform 
options, the paper identiﬁ  es the key features of 
China’s balance of payments and international 
investment position: a relatively low level of 
ﬁ  nancial integration with the global economy, 
which has lagged behind trade integration; 
a large net foreign asset position, which is 
difﬁ  cult to reconcile with the country’s relative 
factor endowment and level of development; 
the absolute predominance of foreign exchange 
reserves – and symmetrically the relatively 
small weight of non-reserve assets – in total 
foreign assets, which ultimately implies a 
concentration of foreign asset ownership in the 
public sector (government, state-owned banks 
and enterprises); the prevalence of FDI in gross 
foreign liabilities and the relatively low stock of 
external debt, particularly short-term debt; and 
a signiﬁ  cant amount of unrecorded assets held 
abroad by Chinese residents.
Several factors may explain the direction and 
composition of China’s capital ﬂ  ows, including 
the adoption of an “open-door” policy to foreign 
investment (particularly FDI), the pragmatic 
strategy that prevailed in the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis and the focus on reserve accumulation 
for precautionary purposes. A further explanation 
is provided by the vast literature on institutions, 
which offers a plausible key to interpreting 
the pattern and composition of capital ﬂ  ows in 
China. According to this literature, institutions 
are a complementary input of capital and labour 
in production. They are endogenous to society 10
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and are the outcome of tensions among different 
interest groups whose goals may conﬂ  ict with 
one another. Thus, institutions change over 
time, reshaping the economic landscape of a 
country. This paper speculates that if the ongoing 
reform effort leads to an improvement in local 
institutions in China, fostering the protection of 
property rights and the presence and perfection 
of markets, the accumulation of foreign reserves 
may come to an end, FDI may cease to be the 
dominant component in foreign liabilities and 
China may even become a net borrower in 
international capital markets. Understandably, 
the process will take time and the ﬁ  nal outcome 
will depend on which group in Chinese society 
eventually prevails.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
discusses the role of the renminbi’s peg to the 
US dollar in the context of China’s development 
strategy in recent decades. Section 3 discusses 
the domestic costs of the peg. Section 4 makes 
the case for greater ﬂ  exibility in the renminbi 
exchange rate. Sections 5 and 6 analyse China’s 
external position and its determinants. Section 7 
presents the policy implications of opening up 
the capital account. Section 8 concludes.11
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2  THE PEG AS AN EXTERNAL MONETARY 
ANCHOR
A stable exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar 
has been an important element of China’s 
development strategy in the past decades. In 
principle, an exchange rate peg can provide an 
essential monetary anchor for price stability by 
linking domestic monetary policy to the rate of 
inﬂ  ation of a large, non-inﬂ  ationary economy. 
Obstfeld (2006) argues that, historically, this 
has been an important beneﬁ  t of the renminbi’s 
peg to the US dollar in China, where the link 
between monetary instruments and targets is 
weak and unstable, the reliability of economic 
and  ﬁ   nancial indicators for policy-making is 
questionable and ﬁ  nancial markets are relatively 
thin. China has had a de facto ﬁ  xed exchange 
rate regime since the 1980s. However, until 
the mid-1990s, monetary policy remained 
largely independent of the exchange rate 
and the renminbi had to adjust frequently 
to accommodate relatively high domestic 
inﬂ   ation and absorb competitiveness losses 
(see Chart 1).
Between 1988 and 1993, a dual exchange rate 
system emerged, whereby the ofﬁ  cial  ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate coexisted with a market-
determined rate in special foreign exchange 
markets called “swap centres”. With the sharp 
depreciation of the market-determined rate in 
the early 1990s, the ﬁ  xed ofﬁ  cial rate became 
increasingly overvalued. Thus, in 1994, the 
ofﬁ  cial rate was devalued and uniﬁ  ed with the 
market rate in the swap centres. At the same 
time, the exchange rate policy was ofﬁ  cially 
changed into a managed ﬂ   oat, although the 
renminbi has been de facto pegged to the US 
dollar since 1995. A limited degree of ﬂ  exibility 
was introduced as a result of the exchange rate 
reforms of 21 July 2005, which among other 
things implied a small, one-off nominal 
appreciation against the US dollar.1
Together with other structural reforms that have 
opened up the Chinese economy to competition 
and liberalised price-setting mechanisms for 
most goods and services, the peg has successfully 
helped to stabilise the roller-coaster inﬂ  ation 
of the 1980s. Chinese consumer price inﬂ  ation 
has fallen signiﬁ  cantly since the exchange rate 
reforms of 1994 and has remained relatively 
stable since then (see Chart 1).2
2.1  IMPACT OF THE PEG ON TRADE
Whether the renminbi peg to the US dollar 
has also served the purpose of promoting 
external trade in the context of China’s so-
called “export-led” growth model is still open 
to debate. According to one argument, the peg 
has not led to trade creation as it has not brought 
about exchange rate stability in effective terms, 
as shown for example by the large swings in 
the real EER (see Chart 2). Between 1994 and 
1997, the real EER of the renminbi appreciated 
sharply as a positive inﬂ  ation differential with 
China’s major trading partners prevailed while 
the authorities attempted to deﬂ  ate the economy. 
With the taming of inﬂ  ation in the late 1990s, 
the real EER of the renminbi changed mostly on 
account of movements of the US dollar against 
the currencies of major trading partners, such as 
the euro and the Japanese yen.
Chart 3 shows that the volatility in non-dollar 
exchange rates of the renminbi has been 
See Huang and Wang (2004) for a review of the evolution of  1 
China’s exchange rate regime in the past two decades.
Obstfeld (2006) provides a more comprehensive discussion of  2 
the argument.
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considerable, frequently entailing, for example, 
bilateral monthly appreciations or depreciations 
against the euro and the yen of more than 4%. 
Thus, in view of China’s substantial trade 
ﬂ  ows with Europe and Japan, the peg cannot 
be justiﬁ   ed on the basis of trade-enhancing 
effects that supposedly work through real 
exchange rate stabilisation. As Obstfeld 
(2006) notes, “at best we have trade creation 
with the US (and countries pegged to the dollar) 
and trade diversion with respect to Europe and 
Japan”.
Consistent with this interpretation, Chart 4 
shows that the swings in the real EER bear no 
transparent relationship to the behaviour of 
China’s current account balance. Large real 
depreciations of the renminbi have often been 
associated with current account deteriorations, 
and vice versa. This suggests that China’s 
current account balance is also explained by 
structural factors affecting the domestic saving-
investment gap.
2.2  CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS AND THE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT
Although domestic consumption has grown 
rapidly in China, it has lagged behind the 
overall growth rate of the economy for many 
years. As a result, its share of GDP has fallen 
steadily over time (see Chart 5); in 2006 it stood 
at 52%, signiﬁ  cantly lower than in, for example, 
the United States (86%), the euro area (78%), 
India (69%) and Korea (68%). The falling share 
of consumption in GDP has been matched by 
a rapid increase in that of savings. Overall, 
domestic savings account for around a half of 
Chinese GDP, one of the highest shares among 
economies of comparable size and level of 
development. As the share of consumption has 
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fallen, China’s growth has become increasingly 
dependent on investment and foreign demand 
(see Chart 6).
An increase in gross savings and a fall in 
consumption are not uncommon across 
catching-up economies, and it has been argued 
that a similar pattern should be expected in 
China. However, China’s saving ratio is high 
by any standard, and it has been more than 
sufﬁ  cient to ﬁ  nance the high and growing level 
of capital formation that has characterised the 
country’s growth pattern over recent decades. 
With the widening of the domestic savings-
investment gap, China’s external imbalances 
have increased, as reﬂ   ected in the high and 
growing trade and current account surpluses 
and rising foreign exchange reserves. The trade 
balance, for example, rose to a record surplus of 
USD 178 billion in 2006 (6.7% of GDP) from 
USD 102 billion in the previous year (4.6% of 
GDP). Moreover, as a high proportion of the 
country’s stock of external assets are foreign 
exchange reserves held in US dollars, China has 
also become an important source of ﬁ  nancing of 
the US current account deﬁ  cit.
China’s external imbalances have attracted 
much attention recently. These imbalances are 
symptoms of domestic structural weaknesses 
that relate to the country’s saving and 
consumption behaviour. Many studies have tried 
to explain the structural drivers of Chinese 
savings. The broad consensus is that the rise in 
domestic savings has been caused by a 
combination of factors affecting both household 
and corporate savings, particularly: i) a decline 
in the share of disposable income in GDP, which 
has closely matched the fall in the share of 
consumption;  3 ii) an increase in precautionary 
savings due to the need to provide for healthcare, 
basic education and retirement, given the lack of 
sufﬁ   cient public provision of these services 
resulting from the restructuring of public 
enterprises; iii) weaknesses in the ﬁ  nancial 
system, which impose borrowing constraints 
and limit households’ access to consumer 
ﬁ  nance; iv) demographic trends, especially the 
In turn, the fall in the share of disposable income in GDP reﬂ  ects  3 
both weak wage growth and a decline in investment income 
as a share of GDP. The former is related to the availability of 
substantial under-utilised labour resources in the economy. 
The latter is related to the low interest rates on bank deposits, 
which have been the dominant vehicle of household savings. The 
low-dividend policy and the narrow shareholder base have also 
prevented Chinese households from beneﬁ  ting from the increase 
in corporate wealth. See IMF Regional Economic Outlook, 
May 2006.
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fall in the dependency ratio; 4 and v) institutional 
factors, particularly the low dividend policy and 
the high level of retained earnings of Chinese 
corporations. A sustainable reduction of external 
imbalances ultimately requires an adjustment of 
the underlying forces driving these structural 
trends in both household and corporate savings.
According to World Bank data, China’s dependency ratio was  4 
45% in 2003, down from 67% in 1980. As a comparison, the 
dependency ratio in India and Mexico was 60% in 2003 (source: 
World Development Indicators). However, China’s dependency 
ratio is projected to start rising again after 2010 to reach around 
65% in 2050, mainly as a result of the birth control programme 
implemented since 1979 (the “one-child Policy”; see United 
Nations, World Population Prospects:  The 2004 Revision 
Population Database).15
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The renminbi’s hard peg to the US dollar is 
undesirable as a long-term foundation for 
managing monetary policy, since it reduces the 
range of policy options available to respond to 
real shocks hitting the economy and introduces 
distortions in the process of adjustment to 
structural economic changes, such as the real 
currency appreciation due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. The peg also poses a 
monetary policy dilemma between controlling 
inﬂ   ation and limiting foreign capital inﬂ  ows. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that the peg may 
become unsustainable in the long run. China’s 
exchange rate arrangement leads to a rapid 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and 
monetary expansion, which in turn generates a 
liquidity overhang in the ﬁ  nancial system. So far, 
this risk has been partly mitigated by central bank 
sterilisation intervention. However, sterilisation 
implies some costs, including an opportunity cost 
from accumulating large stocks of low-yielding 
liquid instruments on banks’ balance sheets. 
Moreover, the peg favours a credit expansion, 
which may lead to overinvestment. This, in 
turn, can generate deﬂ  ation and recession in the 
long run. Deﬂ  ation affects the corporate sector, 
as proﬁ  ts fall and the real interest rate on loans 
increases. Non-performing loans can also 
increase rapidly, thereby undermining ﬁ  nancial 
stability. There is no ﬁ  rm evidence as to whether 
such a chain of events may be actually unfolding 
at the current juncture in China. Nevertheless, 
the emergence of pockets of excess capacity in 
some sectors, the rising costs of central bank 
sterilisation intervention and the growing external 
and domestic imbalances suggest that the hard 
peg may have outlived its usefulness for China.
3.1 RECENT  TRENDS
In more recent times, mounting evidence suggests 
that China is facing an increasing challenge 
to maintain its currency’s hard peg to the US 
dollar. The essence of the argument lies in Robert 
Mundell’s “inconsistent trinity” hypothesis, 
which postulates that it is impossible for a country 
to achieve simultaneously a ﬁ  xed exchange rate 
and an independent monetary policy if capital is 
free to move internationally. So far, it has been 
possible to ﬁ  x the renminbi exchange rate without 
overriding domestic monetary policy by imposing 
tight controls on the capital account and by 
maintaining close restrictions on the cross-border 
movement of capital. This has allowed a certain 
degree of monetary autonomy to be retained 
through the use of administrative measures, such 
as increases in the reserve requirement ratio 
on bank deposits and the so-called “window 
guidance” policy, which aims to control the 
growth of domestic credit to certain sectors.
However, capital controls tend to lose their 
effectiveness over time. Rising capital inﬂ  ows, 
compounded by large current account surpluses, 
have exacerbated the trade-off between the 
ﬁ   xed exchange rate and monetary autonomy. 
China recorded a current account surplus of 
USD 250 billion in 2006 (9.3% of GDP), on 
top of which net ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows contributed to 
increase further the overall balance of payments 
surplus. Net FDI inﬂ  ows averaged nearly 5% 
of GDP annually in the ﬁ  ve years prior to the 
Asian crisis. They have fallen since then, but 
were still USD 61 billion in 2006 (2.3% of 
GDP). Other capital ﬂ  ows – probably mostly 
speculative in nature – grew signiﬁ  cantly  in 
2004 (to USD 91 billion) but were negative in 
the following two years (see Chart 7).
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Overall, the twin surpluses of China’s balance 
of payments (a large and growing current 
account surplus compounded by a surplus in 
the capital account balance) create appreciation 
pressures on the renminbi exchange rate, offset 
by repeated ofﬁ   cial intervention in foreign 
exchange markets.5 Ofﬁ  cial  intervention, 
deﬁ  ned as the change in the stock of reserves, 
was USD 240 billion in 2006, or 9.1% of GDP, 
a trend that has continued in 2007. As a result 
of this intervention, China’s stock of foreign 
exchange reserves has grown around eightfold 
since the beginning of 2000, to 
USD 1,202 billion in March 2007 – the largest 
stock in the world, equivalent to around 46% 
of GDP and almost 630% of overall short-term 
debts (see Chart 8).
Over time, the People’s Bank of China has 
conducted large-scale open market operations 
in order to partially sterilise the domestic 
monetary expansion caused by foreign exchange 
intervention. These open market operations 
are normally carried out through sterilisation 
bills issued by the central bank and exchanged 
for cash with the banking system. As a rough 
estimate, the central bank currently sterilises 
around half of the increase in reserves (see 
Chart 9) and in March 2007 the outstanding 
stock of sterilisation debt was around 40% of 
ofﬁ  cial reserves (see Chart 10). The majority 
of this debt had a maturity of less than one 
year. Moreover, hikes in compulsory reserve 
requirements on bank deposits have recently 
complemented issuances of short-term central 
bank bills as a means of sterilising foreign 
exchange reserve inﬂ   ows and of controlling 
bank liquidity. The ratio of reserve requirements 
on deposits increased from 7.5% in July 2005 to 
11.5% in May 2007.
For a comprehensive discussion of the main challenges stemming  5 
from the twin surpluses of China’s b.o.p., see also the People’s 
Bank of China, Financial Stability Review, September 2005, Part 
II, page 17.
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3.2 STERILISATION  COSTS
However, sterilisation entails some costs, 
which are likely to increase more than 
proportionally as the stock of reserves rises. 
The direct cost on the balance sheet of the 
central bank is given by the coupon paid on 
the liabilities issued to acquire reserves, net 
of the income generated by these reserves – 
which, more properly, should be adjusted for 
the ex post valuation effects due to exchange 
rate changes. This cost has been virtually 
nil in China so far, as the yields of the main 
sterilisation instruments have been lower than 
the interest rates on medium and long-term US 
government bonds, which is where a large part 
of China’s ofﬁ  cial reserves is likely invested 
(see Chart 11). But there are some risks. As 
the total stock of sterilisation bonds increases, 
the People’s Bank of China may have to pay 
higher interest rates in future, both to place 
new bonds and to reﬁ  nance the existing stock. 
Moreover, an increase in domestic interest rates 
might be triggered, for example, by the policy 
response to a pick-up in domestic inﬂ  ation. 
As the outstanding stock of sterilisation debt 
has an average maturity of less than one year, 
an increase in domestic interest rates has 
the potential to feed relatively quickly into 
sterilisation bond yields.
Most importantly, in order to manage domestic 
monetary conditions, the authorities have to 
revert to administrative controls on credit and 
lending, which in turn create distortions and 
efﬁ  ciency losses. An example of this can be 
traced in 2005. Restrictions on bank lending 
alongside strong deposit growth generated 
a liquidity overhang in the banking system, 
which ultimately fuelled a large demand of 
PBC sterilisation bills and pushed the yields on 
these instruments below the rates that banks pay 
on deposits (see Chart 12). Thus, given these 
lending controls, the true cost of sterilisation 
is partly transferred off the balance sheet of 
the central bank and onto the balance sheet of 
the banking system, inﬂ  ating the sterilisation 
proﬁ   ts of the People’s Bank of China and 
raising concerns for banks’ proﬁ  tability  and 
the stability of the ﬁ   nancial system in the 
long run. Arguably, were these administrative 
distortions not to exist, sterilisation bond yields 
would be higher and the sterilisation proﬁ  ts of 
the People’s Bank of China would be lower.
Moreover, the growing mismatch between the 
central bank’s foreign currency denominated 
assets and its domestic currency denominated 
liabilities poses the risk that a renminbi 
appreciation would reduce the local currency 
value of the central bank’s assets, while the 
Chart 11 Primary yields of PBC sterilisation 
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local currency value of the liabilities would 
remain unchanged. This could trigger potentially 
huge capital losses on the balance sheet of the 
monetary authority – although, in practice, 
the exact importance of this channel for the 
conduct of monetary policy is widely debated in
the literature.
More broadly, the subordination of monetary 
policy to foreign exchange policy hinders 
progress in interest rate liberalisation, which 
is a key condition for the development of an 
effective transmission mechanism for monetary 
policy. The development of strong domestic 
institutions for independent policy-making may 
also be delayed, and the economy may become 
increasingly exposed to external shocks. 
This vulnerability, in particular, will become 
increasingly relevant as China’s integration into 
the global economy advances.
3.3  CREDIT AND INVESTMENT BOOM
Despite the increasing rates of sterilisation, 
these interventions – which in terms of 
magnitude and duration are quite unique in the 
history of the current international monetary 
system – have contributed to fuel robust 
liquidity growth in the economy. This growth 
is demonstrated by the strong rise in monetary 
and credit aggregates, such as bank loans 
and M2, which have consistently overshot 
the ofﬁ   cial targets (see Chart 13). In turn, 
abundant domestic liquidity favours a credit 
expansion, which may lead to an investment 
boom, excessive build-up of capacity and 
falling prices. Under extreme circumstances, 
overcapacity may result in deﬂ  ation  and 
recession in the long run. The corporate 
sector suffers from deﬂ  ation, since proﬁ  ts fall 
and the real interest rate on loans increases. 
Non-performing loans can therefore rapidly 
increase, undermining through this channel 
also the stability of the banking sector.
Chinese investment has risen very rapidly in 
recent years, both in terms of level and as a 
share of GDP, and has become the single most 
important driver of overall growth, accounting 
for around 50% of real GDP growth over the 
past ﬁ  ve years. The investment share of nominal 
GDP has also increased substantially in the past 
decade, from around 35% in 1995 to 44% in 
2006 – a record high by regional standards and 
a level comparable to that in several other East 
Asian economies prior to the 1997-98 crisis
(see Chart 14).
Sustained investment growth and increasing 
investment shares of GDP are not necessarily 
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indicative of a risk of overcapacity. In principle, 
rapid investment growth may result from a 
rational response by the corporate sector to 
current and expected demand conditions. High 
investment shares of GDP are also common for 
catching-up economies. Ceteris paribus, fast-
growing economies need comparatively faster 
capital accumulation to keep the capital stock 
constant as a share of GDP.
Indices of corporate proﬁ  tability have remained 
broadly sound in China, whereas excessive 
investment should have led to overproduction, 
falling prices and a proﬁ   t squeeze (see 
Chart 15). However, other indices of capital 
efﬁ   ciency, such as the marginal product of 
capital, have fallen recently, suggesting that the 
productivity of additional investment has fallen 
(see Chart 16). It has been argued that such falls 
can be expected following a protracted period 
of investment growth. Moreover, although the 
different classiﬁ   cation of investment across 
countries renders international comparisons not 
entirely appropriate, the marginal product of 
capital in China in 2006 was still comparable to 
the level in other countries in the region, such as 
Korea and Indonesia.
In a country with a low capital-to-labour ratio, 
a falling marginal product of capital may also 
signal an inefﬁ   cient allocation of capital. A 
signiﬁ   cant share of Chinese investment is 
ﬁ   nanced through retained proﬁ   ts. In addition, 
Chinese  ﬁ   nancial markets are still in their 
infancy: the vast majority of ﬁ  nancial assets are 
intermediated by the banking system. The equity 
market is relatively thin. Traded securities, 
such as corporate bonds, are negligible. Other 
ﬁ   nancial services, including insurance, are 
also relatively undeveloped. This suggests 
that the efﬁ   ciency gains in capital allocation 
from promoting more sophisticated ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries and products could potentially be 
very high.
Data at industry level suggest that the risk of 
overcapacity may be more material in some 
sectors of the Chinese economy. For example, 
the automobile and steel industries – together 
accounting for over 15% of total industrial 
output – have experienced rapid production and 
inventory growth, a shift to net exports and, at 
the same time, a signiﬁ  cant fall in prices, proﬁ  ts 
and capacity utilisation rates, which taken 
together may be seen as evidence of excessive 
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investment. A real estate boom in some cities 
(partly due to the ongoing urbanisation process) 
compounds the overinvestment problem. The 
issue may not be detected by aggregate 
indicators of capital efﬁ   ciency (such as the 
marginal product of capital or indicators of 
corporate proﬁ  tability) because the build-up of 
overcapacity in those sectors is partly offset by 
the lack of investment in other sectors of the 
Chinese economy, such as public and rural 
infrastructures, transportation and agriculture. 
This problem is acknowledged by the Chinese 
authorities, who earlier in 2005 identiﬁ  ed  a 
number of sectors where problems of excess 
capacity were acute and targeted them with 
administrative measures to curb further capacity 
build-up.6 The latest evidence points to a 
slowdown in investment growth since the 
second half of 2006, especially in the sectors 
most affected by overcapacity. However, 
investment is still the major driver of GDP 
growth.
3.4  CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION AND ASSET 
PRICES
Under China’s pegged exchange rate regime, 
domestic policies are oriented to the achievement 
of an external target. This implies a cost in terms 
of loss of control over domestic monetary policy: 
liquidity expands and contracts to preserve the 
foreign exchange rate of the domestic currency 
vis-à-vis the anchor currency, thus making it 
more difﬁ  cult for monetary policy to address 
price stability and activity objectives.
Despite the abundant liquidity and the 
rapid economic expansion seen in recent 
years, inﬂ   ationary pressures have remained 
exceptionally low in China, with the annual 
CPI index hovering around 2% since the current 
credit boom started in 2003 (see Chart 17). 
Headline inﬂ   ation accelerated somewhat in 
mid-2004 and again in the ﬁ  rst half of 2007, but 
in both cases the pick-up was mainly driven by 
the food component of the index, which has a 
relatively high weight in China’s CPI basket. 
“Core” measures of inﬂ  ation (excluding food) 
remained broadly stable, growing by less 
than 1% over the period. Food prices have 
traditionally been the most volatile component of 
China’s CPI basket and the acceleration in food 
prices in early 2007 has been largely attributed 
to one-off factors. Producer price inﬂ  ation has 
also remained broadly contained.
The favourable combination of rapid economic 
expansion and low inﬂ   ation has been mainly 
ascribed to the fact that substantial banking 
liquidity and the associated acceleration in 
credit growth has been largely conﬁ  ned  to 
ﬁ   nance investment rather than consumption. 
Consequently, consumer demand has been 
relatively weak compared with output growth, 
as reﬂ  ected in a falling share of consumption 
in GDP (see Chart 18). On the other hand, 
the ongoing investment boom has continually 
added to the economy’s productive capacity, 
thereby increasing potential output and helping 
to ease pressures on domestic prices. Moreover, 
although wages have risen in recent years due to 
substantial underutilised labour resources, wage 
increases have been relatively modest compared 
with the growth of productivity. Indeed, wages 
The sectors targeted were the automotive, steel, ferrous metal and  6 
electricity sectors. The measures adopted included instructions 
to banks to tighten lending to these sectors, measures to promote 
industrial consolidation and controlled start-up licences. Similar 
measures were also introduced in the cement, coal, aluminium 
and coke industries.
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as a share of GDP have fallen from around 55% 
in 2000 to 48% in 2006 (see Chart 18). Falling 
prices in sectors with overcapacity have offset 
the rise in services inﬂ   ation and the upward 
adjustment in certain administered prices.
However, abundant domestic liquidity has 
been partly channelled into the stock market, 
contributing to a sharp rise in equity valuations. 
The Shanghai Composite Index rose by 130% 
in 2006 and by a further 56% in the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2007, despite a number of episodes of sharp 
daily corrections during the period. Strong gains 
in equity prices have triggered concerns over the 
sustainability of the current valuations.
3.5  POTENTIAL RISKS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
If sustained, China’s ongoing credit expansion 
and build-up of overcapacity may result in 
deﬂ   ation and, under severe circumstances, 
recession. The corporate sector suffers from 
deﬂ  ation because proﬁ  ts fall, the real interest 
rate on loans increases and the real value of the 
debt stock increases. Non-performing loans can 
therefore grow rapidly, undermining the stability 
of the banking system.
According to some estimates, loans extended 
since 2002 represent around 57% of the total 
loan book of Chinese banks (Setser, 2005). 
Thus, the health of the banking system depends 
increasingly on the quality of the loans extended 
during the current lending boom. If a fraction 
of these loans becomes non-performing, banks 
could face potentially huge losses.
This problem is compounded by the existing 
weaknesses in Chinese banks, where proﬁ  t 
margins are relatively thin, capital levels are low 
and asset quality is weak, and where risk 
management and control practices are still 
underdeveloped. Despite a recent restructuring 
of the three largest commercial banks (all state-
owned and accounting for around 50% of total 
banking assets), which has lowered the ratio of 
non-performing loans from 17.2% of total loans 
in 2004 to 8% today,7 asset quality still remains 
low by international standards, especially among 
smaller banks. In addition to non-performing 
loans of USD 206 billion, commercial banks 
have an estimated USD 270 billion of problem 
loans and, at end-2005, banks representing a 
quarter of total banking assets still failed to 
comply with the 8% Basle II capital adequacy 
requirement. According to a recent report by 
Fitch, the ratings agency, the Chinese 
government has spent around USD 400 billion 
(15% of 2006 GDP) bailing out state-owned 
banks since 1998  8 Of course, any concern 
regarding potential ﬁ   nancial stability risks in 
China has to be weighted against the country’s 
massive stock of foreign exchange reserves and 
fairly modest public debt – a position that could 
eventually provide signiﬁ   cant resources for 
bailing out ﬁ  nancial institutions in the event of 
systemic distress.
3.6  OPPORTUNITY COST OF BANKS’ LIQUIDITY 
HOLDINGS
In addition to the potential risks to domestic 
ﬁ  nancial stability, there is also an opportunity 
cost of a rising share of liquid assets on banks’ 
balance sheets. The Chinese banking system has 
grown considerably since the early 1990s, in 
tandem with the increase in domestic savings. 
Deposits as a share of GDP rose almost twofold 
This is still signiﬁ  cantly higher than, for example, the 2% among  7 
Indian banks.
See China: Taking Stock of Banking System NPLs, Special  8 
Report by Fitch Ratings (30 May 2006), available online at: 
http://www.ﬁ  tchratings.com/dtp/pdf2-06/bchi3005.pdf
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between 1990 and 2005 – faster than in any 
other relevant benchmark group (emerging 
Asia, Latin America, eastern Europe and the 
G7 countries; see Chart 19). In terms of level, 
the current share of more than 160% of GDP 
is substantially higher than in all other relevant 
comparators. This rapid expansion was partly 
fostered by the relative underdevelopment of 
other segments of the Chinese capital markets, 
which led households and corporations to 
channel the bulk of the increase in domestic 
private savings into bank deposits. Consistent 
with this, bank deposits still remain the 
dominant form for private individuals to 
accumulate savings, accounting for around 
three-quarters of the total stock of households’ 
ﬁ  nancial assets in China, compared with 50% 
in Japan and less than 16% in the United States 
(see Chart 20).
On the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, the 
rapid expansion of deposits was associated with 
a steady pick-up in lending activity. However, 
given the existing caps and administrative 
controls on credit, lending growth has generally 
lagged behind the growth of deposits, and the 
loan-to-deposit ratio has fallen from 78% in 
2002 to 69% currently (see Chart 21). This has 
helped to generate a surplus of internal funding 
on banks’ balance sheets that the existing 
capital controls – particularly the restrictions on 
outward capital movements – prevented from 
channelling overseas. Consistent with this, the 
share of banks’ foreign assets in total assets has 
been on a mildly downward trend during the 
period (see Chart 22).
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Thus, because of lending controls and capital 
account restrictions, the bulk of the growth in 
deposits ultimately fed into banks’ liquid assets, 
which have risen from around 10% of total 
banking assets in 2002 to more than 17% today 
(see Chart 22) – equivalent to around USD 
950 billion or 37% of China’s GDP in 2006. 
Chart 23 reports the instrument breakdown 
of this stock and shows that bank liquidity is 
almost equally split between i) deposits with 
the People’s Bank of China (both mandatory 
and voluntary – the former including mostly the 
compulsory reserves that banks are required to 
set aside on deposits) and ii) PBC bills (mainly 
short-term central bank securities issued for 
sterilisation purposes). Only a tiny portion of 
the overall liquidity stock is held in cash in 
bank vaults.
The high share of liquid assets on the balance 
sheets of Chinese banks therefore essentially 
represents the counterpart of the liabilities 
issued by the central bank to sterilise its foreign 
exchange intervention. These instruments 
generally yield low returns. On central bank 
deposits, the People’s Bank of China currently 
pays an annual interest rate ranging from 0.99% 
on voluntary deposits to 1.89% on mandatory 
deposits. Yields on PBC bonds are somewhat 
higher, ranging between 2% and 3%, depending 
on maturity, but they are still signiﬁ  cantly 
lower than, for example, current benchmark 
lending rates, even at the shortest end of the 
maturity curve (see Chart 24). Low liquidity 
yields clearly entail opportunity costs for banks, 
which in turn may create inefﬁ  ciencies  for 
depositors, borrowers and bank shareholders 
(at present mainly the State), and may be one 
important reason behind the low proﬁ  tability of
Chinese banks.
3.7  A MONETARY POLICY DILEMMA
According to the UIP condition, the expected 
change in the nominal bilateral exchange rate 
of the renminbi against the US dollar is equal 
to the interest rate differential between the 
Chart 22 Banks’ foreign and liquid assets as 
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two currencies (abstracting from possible risk 
premia). Formally:
Et(st+1) – st = it – it
*
 ,
where st is (the logarithm of) the spot exchange 
rate at time t, expressed in terms of units of the 
domestic currency (in this case, renminbi) per 
unit of foreign currency (i.e. the US dollar); 
Et (s t+1) denotes the expectation at time t of 
the spot exchange rate at time t+1; and it and 
i*
t represent the nominal risk-free interest rates 
in China and the United States respectively. 
Under the UIP condition, expectations of a 
renminbi appreciation (i.e. Et (s t+1) – st < 0) 
would normally result in downward pressures 
on Chinese interest rates, given US interest 
rates. Although it is widely recognised that UIP 
does not hold in practice, the condition can be 
used to highlight how, in the absence of capital 
controls and other market frictions, the current 
constellation of domestic and foreign interest 
rates would be consistent with large inﬂ  ows of 
speculative capital into China. The condition 
also highlights a dilemma between internal and 
external objectives currently facing the Chinese 
policy-maker.
Forward contracts provide one crude measure of 
markets’ expectations of renminbi appreciation. 
Chart 25 plots the expectations based on the 
forward premium at different maturities, derived 
from renminbi non-deliverable forwards traded 
off-shore in Hong Kong.9 It shows that the 
implied one-year-ahead appreciation of the 
renminbi against the dollar currently ranges 
from 4.4% to 4.7%, depending on the contract.10 
Expectations based on forward premia are not 
fully accurate owing, for example, to market 
illiquidity and the difﬁ   culty of correctly 
identifying all the risk premia priced in the 
underlying contract. However, the magnitude of 
the implied appreciation appears roughly 
consistent with expectations derived from 
survey-based measures. For example, a survey 
of professional forecasters reported in the 
Foreign Exchange Consensus Forecast of 
March 2007 suggested an expected 6.1% 
appreciation against the dollar in one year. 
Combining these appreciation expectations with 
the risk-free interest rate in the United States 
(currently 5.25% as measured by the Federal 
Funds rate) and feeding them into the UIP 
condition yields an implied risk-free interest 
rate in China of close to zero – a situation that, 
in turn, could degenerate into a liquidity trap.
In fact, from a theoretical point of view, UIP 
only holds if capital is perfectly mobile and 
if domestic and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes – conditions that are hardly met in 
China owing to capital controls, higher political, 
sovereign and default risks relative to the 
United States, and the asymmetric enforcement 
and protection of property rights in the two 
countries. These frictions ensure that the risk-
free rate in China can deviate signiﬁ  cantly from 
the level predicted by the UIP condition.11
Given the off-shore nature of these contracts, their pricing  9 
may not fully reﬂ  ect the interest rate differential between the 
two currencies (see Obstfeld, 2006; Ma, Ho, and McCauley, 
2004).
Having expressed the exchange rate in terms of renminbi per  10 
US dollar, expectations of renminbi appreciation would result 
in a negative forward premium, and vice versa. However, for 
reasons of convenience, Chart 25 plots the inverse of the forward 
premium, so that a renminbi appreciation appears with a positive 
sign.
See Gandolfo (2000), International Finance and Open-Economy  11 
Macroeconomics, Springer, pp. 49-51.
Chart 25 Expectations of renminbi/US dollar 




























Notes: The data reported shows the inverse of the forward 
premia for NDF contracts at different maturities, so that a 
renminbi appreciation appears with a positive sign. Forward 
premia are expressed as a percentage and annualised.25
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FROM THE PEG
If investors can hedge against exchange rate 
risk in forward markets, expectations on future 
exchange rates can be replaced by the forward 
exchange rate and the UIP becomes the CIP 
condition:
ft – st = it – it
*
 ,
where  ft is (the logarithm of) the one-period-
ahead forward rate and the term ft – st is 
commonly referred to as the forward margin.
It is well known that the CIP theorem holds 
quite closely in open ﬁ  nancial markets.12 If this 
is the case, the forward margin is equal to the 
interest rate differential between the two 
currencies. Otherwise, an arbitrage opportunity 
arises, as trading strategies that would deliver a 
sure proﬁ   t with no currency risk may be 
envisaged on the underlying ﬁ  nancial  assets. 
Alternatively, under CIP, a foreign investor is 
indifferent to placing money in US assets and 
earning the interest rate i*
t or converting the 
money into renminbi at the spot exchange rate, 
earning the Chinese interest rate it, while 
hedging against exchange rate risk using the 
forward market.
However, capital controls in China prevent full 
capital mobility, hence the CIP may fail to hold 
in practice, implying that the forward premium 
may deviate from the interest rate differential. 
This deviation contains some information. 
Chart 26 plots the capital control premium ξt, 
deﬁ  ned as the deviation of the forward premium 
from CIP:
ξt =( ft – st) – (it – it
*
 ).
A negative capital control premium indicates 
that the covered returns on foreign assets are 
lower than the returns on domestic assets, i.e. 
rearranging the deﬁ  nition of ξt: (ft + i*
t ) < (st + it). 
In this case, capital controls mainly prevent 
foreign capital from ﬂ  owing into the country – 
a situation that has characterised China since 
approximately 2003. Conversely, a positive ξt 
indicates that capital account restrictions prevent 
capital from ﬂ  eeing the country. This situation 
characterised China during the late 1990s.
Thus, portfolio equilibrium considerations based 
on interest parity conditions point consistently 
to the conclusion that, in the absence of capital 
controls, China would attract large inﬂ  ows of 
speculative capital. These considerations also 
highlight a policy dilemma between domestic 
and external objectives. In the current juncture, 
relatively high interest rates would be needed 
to cool the rapid growth of economy activity. 
However, high interest rates and the expectation 
of an exchange rate appreciation attract 
capital inﬂ   ows, which in turn exacerbate the 
liquidity overhang and contribute to the further 
stimulation of economic activity. The paradox is 
that the relatively loose monetary stance pursued 
by the People’s Bank of China in order to keep 
the appreciation pressures on the exchange rate 
in check in fact contributes to further stimulate 
the already overheated economy.
Perfect capital mobility implies CIP, but it does not necessarily  12 
imply UIP. For UIP to hold, further assumptions are needed, 
namely perfect asset substitutability, market efﬁ  ciency and risk-
neutral investors. See, for instance, Gandolfo (2000).
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Note: The capital control premia are derived from the CIP 
condition and deﬁ  ned as the deviation of the forward premium 
from the interest rate differential. The deviation is expressed in 
basis points.26
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The rising domestic costs of the peg – reﬂ  ected 
in the large b.o.p. surplus, the continued 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, 
ample domestic liquidity and the sharp run-up 
in equity and asset prices – clearly highlight 
the desirability of reforms in China both to the 
monetary policy framework, in order to allow 
greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility, and to structural 
policies, in order to reduce Chinese households’ 
high propensity to save, to stimulate a more 
permanent increase in domestic consumption 
and to reduce the dependence on investment and 
exports as engines of domestic growth.
Greater exchange rate ﬂ   exibility would be 
beneﬁ  cial from a domestic point of view since 
it would improve investment decisions and 
boost consumers’ purchasing power. Combined 
with  ﬁ   scal reforms to reduce uncertainties 
surrounding the provision of basic public 
services, as well as ﬁ  nancial reforms to remove 
borrowing constraints, it would help to address 
the high precautionary savings in the economy 
and boost consumption, thereby making Chinese 
domestic demand more self-sustained and less 
dependent on exports. Greater ﬂ  exibility would 
also promote a more efﬁ   cient allocation of 
resources between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, support more balanced domestic growth 
and be conducive to ﬁ   nancial sector reform 
and capital account liberalisation, which are 
key policy objectives stated by the Chinese 
authorities.
A strong argument can therefore be made for an 
early move towards greater exchange rate 
ﬂ   exibility, irrespective of whether or not the 
renminbi is substantially undervalued. The focus 
is shifted from b.o.p. adjustment – and from the 
contribution that this may provide to the orderly 
resolution of global current account imbalances – 
to China’s own domestic imbalances. In this 
regard, even a large real appreciation of the 
renminbi would provide only limited relief to 
the adjustment of global imbalances. This is 
underscored by the literature (e.g. Edwards, 
2005; Freund, 2000; Lau et al, 2004) and also 
by simulation results using global econometric 
models such as NiGEM and OEF. These models 
highlight that, although a renminbi appreciation 
would have the correct sign of reducing global 
imbalances, it would be no panacea for the 
resolution of imbalances given that the direct 
impact on the US current account deﬁ  cit is likely 
to be limited, in the absence of parallel changes 
in the United States to raise savings.13 Although 
model simulations are obviously subject to 
substantial caveats, these ﬁ  ndings  underscore 
once more that solving global imbalances 
requires a concerted multilateral effort.
A more important reason for recommending 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in China is that it is 
in the country’s own interest. As the economy 
develops and becomes increasingly integrated 
with the global economy, China will inevitably 
become more exposed to different types of 
macroeconomic shocks, both internally and 
externally. Exchange rate ﬂ   exibility and, by 
extension, a more independent monetary policy 
would help the economy cope better with 
such shocks. This is the main reason why the 
determination of the exchange rate in China 
should be left increasingly to market forces. 
A corollary of this argument is that, in the 
long run, it is a move towards ﬂ  exibility rather 
than a revaluation of the exchange rate that is 
desirable. As the experience of other countries 
shows, rapid economic growth and a strong 
external position constitute relatively favourable 
circumstances for making such a move.
The Chinese authorities have acknowledged the 
challenges arising from the exchange rate 
regime. They have identiﬁ  ed the rising domestic 
costs of the peg and have repeatedly recognised 
the need for some policy adjustment. They have 
also stated on several occasions that, in the long 
 For a discussion of a renminbi shock on global imbalances using  13 
NiGEM, see, for example, Barrell, Holland, and Hurst (2006), 
“Sustainable Adjustment of Global Imbalances” NIESR, mimeo 
(available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07-4/barrell.
pdf). A set of renminbi simulations using OEF is discussed 
in Park (2005), “Coping with Global Imbalances and Asian 
Currencies”, ERD Policy Brief 37, (available at http://www.adb.
org/Documents/EDRC/Policy_Briefs/PB037.pdf ).27
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run, growing integration with the global 
economy will eventually require a fully ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate arrangement. Yet, efforts to 
overhaul the system have been timid so far, and 
the revealed preference of the Chinese policy-
maker has been for a cautious approach to 
exchange rate reform.14
On 21 July 2005, for example, the Chinese  of the 
renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar and emphasised 
their resolve to move towards a more market-
determined exchange rate system. At the same 
time, they took measures to develop the foreign 
exchange market and, on several occasions in 
2006, they made use of the ﬂ  exibility allowed by 
the existing ﬂ  uctuation bands to enable a greater 
appreciation of the renminbi. Furthermore, on 18 
May 2007 they announced a modest widening 
of the trading bands against the dollar – from 
+/-0.3% of the reference rate to +/-0.5% – while 
leaving the trading bands against other major 
currencies unchanged at +/-3%. This move 
resulted in somewhat heightened volatility in 
intra-day trades involving the currency but with 
little discernible impact on the pace of its daily 
ﬂ  uctuation. These are steps in the right direction, 
but they have clearly been too limited to 
signiﬁ  cantly address China’s ongoing domestic 
and external imbalances.
4.1  CONCERNS ABOUT GREATER FLEXIBILITY
Several arguments have been put forward 
to explain the glacial pace of exchange rate 
reform in China. A renminbi appreciation 
may hurt China’s external competitiveness, 
thereby reducing export growth and weakening 
FDI inﬂ  ows. Since export growth has been an 
important engine of the country’s spectacular 
economic performance in the past decades, it 
is feared that a weakened export capacity may 
jeopardise overall growth prospects. However, 
this cost is probably overstated. The direct 
impact of any renminbi appreciation on export 
growth is likely to be muted owing to the high 
import content of China’s exports. Imports 
represent a substantial component of the 
domestic production process in China. Although 
an appreciation of the renminbi would increase 
the cost of processing and assembling goods 
in the country, it would also lower the costs 
of imported intermediate inputs. Therefore, 
a rise in the value of the renminbi is likely to 
have only a limited impact on China’s external 
competitiveness. Devereux and Genberg (2006), 
for instance, using a two-country framework 
where China is assumed to use imported inputs 
in its production process, show that a renminbi 
appreciation would not generate a relevant 
deterioration of the country’s current account 
surplus.
A related concern is that higher exchange rate 
volatility under a ﬂ  exible exchange rate regime 
might affect FDI inﬂ  ows, which have been an 
important determinant of China’s economic 
expansion through technology transfers. 
However, empirical studies generally ﬁ  nd 
that exchange rate volatility has little role in 
explaining FDI inﬂ  ows, which are determined 
rather by the size of the country’s domestic 
markets, GDP and productivity growth, 
political and macroeconomic stability and, more 
broadly, the strength of the domestic institutions 
(UNCTAD, 1999; Lim, 2001).
A second argument concerns the risk of 
deﬂ   ation that may be generated by the 
international pressure mounting on China to 
appreciate its currency – similar to Japan in the 
late 1980s (see, for instance, McKinnon, 2005, 
and McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006). Portfolio 
equilibrium considerations related to the UIP 
condition explain why these pressures can push 
a country into deﬂ   ation. During the 1980s, 
owing to its large current account surplus, Japan 
came under signiﬁ   cant pressure to appreciate 
its currency against the US dollar. To guarantee 
The policy commitments undertaken by the Chinese authorities  14 
in the context of the Multilateral Consultations on Global 
Imbalances with the IMF illustrate very well their awareness 
of the need to increase exchange rate ﬂ  exibility and promote 
more balanced external sector developments, including the need 
to deepen reform of the administration of the foreign exchange 
market and gradually open up the capital account in line with the 
theoretical arguments developed in this paper. These arguments 
are summarised in IMF (2007), “Staff Report on the Multilateral 
Consultation on Global Imbalances with China, the euro area, 
Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States”, available at: http://
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/062907.pdf.28
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portfolio equilibrium, Japanese interest rates fell 
vis-à-vis US rates. Decreasing domestic rates in 
Japan led to an unprecedented asset price bubble 
(both in the real estate and equity markets) and 
overinvestment. In turn, the bubble fuelled 
further expansion of economic activity, since 
corporations found it relatively easy to raise 
funds, either directly through the equity and 
corporate bond markets or through borrowing 
from commercial banks. A share of these 
inﬂ  ated assets appeared on the balance sheets 
of the banking sector in the form of collateral 
and increasingly backed up the lending. When 
the bubble burst in 1989, corporations were 
confronted with declining proﬁ   ts and banks 
with non-performing loans. The excess capacity 
that had built during the years of the asset 
bubble was the main cause of declining prices. 
Bad loans, in turn, could not be offset against 
collateral because of the decreasing value of 
these assets. Consequently, Japan sank into the 
stagnation and deﬂ  ation of the so-called “lost 
decade” of the 1990s.
According to this argument, China today faces a 
scenario similar to that of Japan in the 1990s 
owing to the international pressures for it to 
appreciate its currency.15 Given that US interest 
rates are determined exogenously and investors 
expect an appreciation of the renminbi, portfolio 
equilibrium can only be secured if the interest 
rate on renminbi assets falls below that on dollar 
assets. However, ﬁ  nancial markets in China are 
currently much less developed than they were in 
Japan in the 1990s. Shallow ﬁ  nancial (and in 
particular equity) markets imply that even if 
interest rates fall to low levels and subsequently 
feed a ﬁ  nancial bubble, the risk of overinvestment 
is likely to remain limited. Nevertheless, it is 
also true, as happened in Japan, that a decrease 
in interest rates can generate excessive credit 
provision. Rapid lending growth in China is 
already causing excessive build-up of productive 
capacity in some sectors, which can potentially 
lead to deﬂ   ation and, if left unaddressed, a 
recession in the long run. The genesis of the 
deﬂ  ationary risk for both China and Japan lies in 
their external positions. In the case of China, 
however, excess liquidity, which fuels rapid loan 
growth and overinvestment, is generated by the 
pegged exchange rate and massive intervention 
in foreign exchange markets. A relaxation of the 
peg would permit China to gain control of its 
monetary policy and put an end to liquidity 
accumulation. At the same time, Japan’s “lost 
decade” should be lesson enough of the need for 
“good global governance” in foreign exchange 
markets: inducing expectations of appreciation 
for a currency is a free lunch for speculators and 
may ultimately lead to deﬂ  ation.
A third concern is that an exchange rate 
appreciation could adversely affect rural incomes. 
Indeed, the Chinese rural sector is widely 
believed to be internationally uncompetitive due 
to the large amount of surplus labour combined 
with low productivity growth.16 Policy-makers 
therefore fear that a fall in domestic prices of food 
imports resulting from a renminbi appreciation 
may have signiﬁ  cant adverse consequences for 
farmers. While this is a plausible concern, there 
is, as yet, little empirical evidence to support 
it. Moreover, if rural incomes were a particular 
area of concern for Chinese policy-makers, 
any difﬁ  culties generated by an exchange rate 
appreciation could be addressed more efﬁ  ciently 
through ﬁ  scal transfers to affected households, 
rather than by delaying a move in the exchange 
rate. In any case, in a rapidly developing 
economy, the relative weight of the agricultural 
sector is bound to diminish over time.
Furthermore, it is feared that exchange rate 
ﬂ   exibility may lead to ﬁ   nancial distress in a 
system that, because of the protection offered 
thus far by capital controls, is yet to develop tools 
to deal with exchange rate risk appropriately. 
Indeed, this has proven to be a problem in 
several emerging economies, where sudden 
With the Plaza Accord in September 1985, the G5 (France, Japan,  15 
the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany) 
agreed to depreciate the US dollar vis-à-vis the Japanese yen and 
the Deutsche mark by intervening in foreign exchange markets. 
The devaluation of the US dollar was geared towards reducing 
the large US current account deﬁ  cit and helping the economy to 
exit from recession.
According to estimates provided by the Chinese authorities,  16 
there are around 150 million surplus workers in rural areas. See 
Prasad et al (2005).29
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currency devaluations have imposed a burden on 
ﬁ  rms and banks with large unhedged net foreign 
currency positions. In theory, the situation in 
China is perfectly orthogonal to that in the 
typical emerging economy: banks typically hold 
net foreign assets and therefore would suffer 
from an appreciation of the domestic currency. 
However, the impact of a currency appreciation 
on net foreign asset positions may be different 
from the impact of depreciation on net foreign 
liabilities. Moreover, any direct effect of an 
exchange rate appreciation on Chinese banks 
is likely to be limited, given that their overall 
exposure to foreign exchange risk is relatively 
small by international standards, also owing to 
existing regulations requiring banks to surrender 
most of their foreign exchange receipts to the 
central bank.
Moving to the corporate sector, Chinese ﬁ  rms 
have net foreign liabilities and therefore the 
balance sheet impact of an appreciation of the 
renminbi would be positive, since the value of 
foreign currency debt would decline. Moreover, 
with the existing capital controls in place, 
Chinese  ﬁ   rms and banks would generally be 
sheltered from sudden reversals of foreign capital 
ﬂ  ows leading to large exchange rate changes. 
Indeed, greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility could, 
in fact, facilitate capital account liberalisation by 
preparing the economy to deal with the impact 
of larger cross-border capital ﬂ  ows in a gradual 
manner. The experience of economies such as 
Chile and Israel conﬁ  rms the importance of a 
correct sequencing of exchange rate reform and 
capital account convertibility.
Although the current overall exposures to 
foreign exchange risk of the Chinese corporate 
and banking sectors appear limited, there are 
indications that they have risen in recent years. 
According to Prasad et al (2005), banks’ net 
foreign assets accounted for 3% of broad money 
and 6% of GDP in 2003, and foreign currency 
lending represented around 5% of domestic 
credit and 9% of GDP. These ﬁ  gures compare 
relatively favourably with other countries. 
However, between 2001 and 2003, banks’ foreign 
currency loans to domestic residents rose by over 
60%, net foreign currency liabilities by nearly 
50% and total short-term external debt, which is 
denominated in foreign currencies, by over 50%. 
These trends are likely to continue as China’s 
integration into the global economy advances.
Overall, although a renminbi appreciation 
would be beneﬁ  cial for the Chinese economy 
as a whole, it would not be neutral for different 
sectors of the economy and would possibly 
have relevant distributional effects both across 
and within sectors. This may be an important 
reason why a renminbi appreciation is a highly 
politically sensitive issue in China.
4.2  ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE EXIT STRATEGY
Greater exchange rate ﬂ   exibility can remedy 
many of the drawbacks of the tightly managed 
exchange rate regime that have been highlighted 
in the previous sections. It would allow the 
central bank to regain full control over domestic 
monetary conditions. It would provide a further 
adjustment channel in the face of internal and 
external shocks. It would prevent further build-
up of liquidity in the ﬁ  nancial system. It would 
promote a more efﬁ  cient allocation of resources 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors and 
support more balanced domestic growth.
The Chinese authorities are aware of these 
beneﬁ   ts and have repeatedly stated their 
resolve to move towards increased ﬂ  exibility 
in the medium term. However, they have also 
recognised that some conditions have to be in 
place to ensure a smooth functioning of a more 
ﬂ   exible system. In particular, a number of 
institutional reforms have to be implemented in 
order to prepare the economic system to manage 
exchange rate risk. These include developing 
a proper foreign exchange market, where the 
central bank shifts from acting as a rate-setter 
to a supervisory role, and introducing more 
sophisticated hedging instruments. The ﬁ  nancial 
and non-ﬁ   nancial corporate sectors will also 
have to learn to adapt to increased foreign 
exchange risk.30
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A sudden move to a fully ﬂ  oating exchange rate 
regime is not advisable since, given the current 
appreciation pressures on the currency and the 
uncertainties surrounding the “equilibrium” 
level of the exchange rate, it would likely 
result in heightened volatility and possibly 
overshooting. Neither would a re-peg at a 
higher rate be a sustainable solution in the long 
run; at best it would postpone the issues of 
external imbalances currently associated with 
the peg and it would not deliver the independent 
monetary policy that China needs. Moreover, 
a re-peg would create expectations of further 
realignments. These would trigger speculative 
capital inﬂ  ows, which in turn would compound 
the ongoing liquidity overhang. Hence, in the 
medium term, an intermediate regime should be 
envisaged to help smooth the transition.
Proposals have been discussed in a number 
of papers (Frenkel, 2004; Obstfeld, 2006). 
Ultimately, the regime that is adopted to 
help smooth the transition should satisfy the 
equilibrium portfolio condition given by the 
UIP. Notoriously, this condition states that, 
in equilibrium, the expected change in the 
exchange rate must equal the differential 
between domestic and US interest rates, plus a 
risk premium. If the expected appreciation of the 
renminbi is greater than that suggested by the 
UIP, capital inﬂ  ows will ensue since investors 
can make an almost certain capital gain by 
investing in renminbi. In order to avoid this, the 
central bank can lower the domestic risk-free 
interest rate so that it becomes unproﬁ  table to 
speculate on an appreciation. Alternatively, it 
can attempt to manipulate agents’ expectations 
of future movements of the currency’s foreign 
exchange, for example by creating uncertainty 
around the central parity. Finally, it can 
introduce a sufﬁ  ciently high transaction cost. For 
instance, capital controls are de facto equivalent 
to a transaction cost.31
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5  CHINA’S EXTERNAL POSITION, FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALISATION
The beneﬁ   ts of capital account liberalisation 
have been widely discussed in the literature. In 
theory, capital account liberalisation promotes a 
more efﬁ  cient international allocation of capital, 
which enhances growth. It allows net transfers of 
resources, which permit consumption smoothing, 
risk sharing and intertemporal capital formation. 
It favours technology transfers from abroad and 
improves corporate governance. In countries with 
weak institutions, it signals commitment to sound 
macroeconomic policies. However, the concrete 
experience of some developing economies has 
been far less clear-cut regarding the beneﬁ  cial 
effects of capital account liberalisation. The 
“Tequila crisis” of 1995, followed by the Asian, 
Russian, Brazilian and Argentine crises, was a 
reminder that combining a ﬁ  xed exchange rate 
with an open capital account may provide fertile 
ground for a crisis. A number of theoretical 
studies have attempted to formalise the potential 
risks of liberalising the capital account when 
institutions are weak and macroeconomic 
policies are inconsistent with the requirements 
of the regime. These risks derive from market 
failures, such as moral hazard and asymmetric 
information, which can be prevented only with 
a sophisticated management of ﬁ  nancial markets 
that cannot easily be achieved by developing 
economies. In this context, capital account 
openness exposes the economy to dependence on 
volatile foreign capital inﬂ  ows that may suddenly 
stop, leading to ﬁ  nancial crises (see Prasad et al, 
2005; Dooley and Walsh, 2000; Dornbush, 2001; 
Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006).
Historically, capital account restrictions in China 
have been credited for delivering a number of 
positive effects. They have allowed a certain 
degree of monetary autonomy to be retained 
in the face of the tightly managed exchange 
rate regime. They have protected the country 
from disruptive capital movements – both from 
speculative inward movements of hot money 
and from capital ﬂ  ight due to concerns for the 
fragile domestic banking system. They have 
been credited with shielding the country from 
vulnerability to ﬁ  nancial contagion, e.g. during 
the Asian crisis – although other factors may also 
have played a role, including the comfortable 
level of foreign exchange reserves vis-à-vis short-
term debt. They have allowed the composition of 
inﬂ  ows to be steered towards more stable forms 
of external ﬁ  nancing, such as FDI.
However, as China’s integration in the global 
economy advances, it is beneﬁ  cial if progress 
is made in terms of liberalising ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. 
There are several arguments that call for a 
progressive opening up of China’s capital 
account. Xiaopu (2003) and Zhang (2005), for 
example, argue that a gradual process of reform 
of both inward and outward ﬂ   ows would be 
beneﬁ   cial to China, since it would stimulate 
the development of domestic ﬁ  nancial markets 
and improve the returns on savings. Moreover, 
a more liberal capital account would provide 
broader diversiﬁ  cation beneﬁ  ts, allowing Chinese 
investors to hold higher shares of foreign assets 
in their portfolios. It would also help to redress 
the concentration of foreign exchange risk on the 
government’s balance sheet currently associated 
with the rising stock of foreign exchange 
reserves, and it would allow a better allocation 
of foreign exchange risk among the different 
sectors of the Chinese economy.
The crucial argument is that capital account 
restrictions become increasingly porous over 
time, especially if the current account is 
already fully liberalised and trade integration 
is growing – as is currently the case in China. 
Aizenman (2006), for example, argues that the 
scale of ﬁ  nancial leakage is proportional to the 
commercial openness of the economy. As the 
economy becomes increasingly commercially 
integrated with the rest of the world, curtailing 
illicit capital ﬂ  ows becomes more costly because 
it requires spending increasing resources on 
monitoring and enforcing the existing capital 
controls. Moreover, ﬁ  nancial innovation can also 
raise the costs of maintaining capital controls 
over time. By their very nature, domestic 
ﬁ  nancial liberalisation and ﬁ  nancial innovation 
generate efﬁ  ciency gains, but they also constrain 32
ECB
Occasional Paper No 82
March 2008
the effectiveness of capital controls in ﬁ  nancial 
markets that are increasingly globally integrated. 
Market forces can thus accelerate capital account 
opening  de facto and later de jure, increasing 
vulnerability to volatile capital ﬂ  ows  and 
restricting policy discretion.
Indeed, there is evidence that loopholes in China’s 
capital controls may have allowed inﬂ  ows of 
unsolicited foreign capital, which have been 
speculating on a renminbi appreciation recently. 
For example, tighter controls on short-term 
foreign borrowing introduced at the end of 2005 
led to a contraction of this type of inﬂ  ow and a 
sharp slowdown in the capital account surplus 
in 2006. At the same time, the trade surplus rose 
sharply, indicating that part of these speculative 
capital inﬂ  ows may have been routed eventually 
into the country disguised as trade ﬂ  ows. Under-
invoicing of imports and over-invoicing of 
exports are typical forms through which trade 
may mask speculative capital inﬂ  ows. FDI is 
another route through which large inﬂ  ows  of 
speculative capital may have entered China 
recently, notwithstanding capital controls. 
Foreign investors may be buying Chinese assets 
that are considered cheap as a result of the 
undervalued exchange rate. Remittances from 
Chinese nationals working abroad are another 
channel through which capital controls may 
be circumvented. In 2006, China was the third 
largest recipient of remittances after India and 
Mexico.
This section documents the recent trends in 
China’s external position by presenting the 
international balance sheet of the country. It 
describes the key stylised facts concerning both 
the gross holdings of foreign assets and liabilities 
and their net balance and composition. It then 
highlights the implications of these features for 
the sustainability and efﬁ  ciency of the country’s 
external position.
5.1  RECENT FEATURES OF CHINA’S BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS
China’s b.o.p. displays several peculiar features. 
A  ﬁ   rst peculiarity, as already pointed out in 
previous sections, is that the country typically 
combines a surplus on the current account with 
a surplus on the capital and ﬁ  nancial accounts – 
one of the few economies in history to have 
done so consistently for more than a decade 
(Yongding, 2007). Under normal circumstances, 
twin b.o.p. surpluses are relatively uncommon 
and, in principle, they should not persist over 
time. In fact, large and persistent twin surpluses 
are fundamentally self-contradictory. By simple 
accounting identity, a current account surplus 
indicates a positive gap between domestic 
savings and investment. Therefore, a more usual 
position for a country with a current account 
surplus is to be a net lender on international 
ﬁ  nancial markets and to run a capital account 
deﬁ  cit. This would allow the surplus of domestic 
savings over available investment opportunities 
to be channelled abroad.
An alternative way to look at China’s twin 
surpluses is to recall the standard accounting 
identity of the b.o.p., which in its most basic 
form states that, in every period, the sum of 
the current account balance (CA), the capital 
and  ﬁ   nancial account balance (KA), errors 
and omissions (EO) and the change in foreign 
exchange reserves (∆RES ) must be zero, i.e.:
CA + KA + EO + ∆RES ≡ 0.
In the absence of ofﬁ  cial  intervention 
(∆RES = 0), and assuming for simplicity 
EO = 0, the identity yields the equilibrium 
condition of the b.o.p.: CA = −KA, which states 
that for countries where the central bank does not 
intervene in foreign exchange markets, a current 
account surplus must be matched by a deﬁ  cit on 
the capital and ﬁ  nancial accounts of similar size, 
and vice versa. In other words, in equilibrium, 
countries should lie on the 45° line of an x-y 
chart plotting the two balances on the axes. Chart 
27, which reports the external balances scaled 
by GDP for a selection of major developed and 
developing economies, shows that this is indeed 
the case for the OECD countries and for the 
vast majority of emerging market economies. 
China’s twin surpluses, however, stand out as an 
exception, together with the external positions of 33
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a small number of economies in South-East Asia. 
Russia also stands out as an outlier, reﬂ  ecting its 
role as a commodity exporter (other major oil 
and commodity exporters are not reported in the 
chart).
The size and composition of the current account 
balance is another conspicuous feature of China’s 
b.o.p. Chart 28 shows that China has recorded a 
current account surplus almost uninterruptedly 
since the early 1990s. This surplus, which was 
relatively moderate at around 2% of annual GDP 
for most of the 1990s, has risen sharply since 
2005 and currently stands at USD 250 billion 
(9.3% of GDP). In accounting terms, the main 
driver of the increase has been the surging trade 
surplus, although other items of the current 
account balance have also contributed to the rise 
(see Chart 28). The net income balance, which 
consists mainly of interest earnings on foreign 
bonds and securities held by Chinese residents 
net of the dividends and retained earnings 
that the Chinese subsidiaries of multinational 
companies accrue to their foreign parents, and 
which was negative for most of the 1990s, 
has recently moved into surplus. In 2006 this 
surplus rose to USD 10 billion, driven by the 
rapid build-up of external ﬁ  nancial  assets 
(notably foreign exchange reserves) in China’s 
i.i.p. in recent years – a point that will be dealt 
with in the next section. China also receives net 
transfers amounting to USD 27 billion annually, 
mainly in the form of remittances from Chinese 
nationals working abroad.
Despite the recent increases in the surpluses of 
the net income and net transfer balances, the 
Chinese current account is still dominated by 
developments in net trade, which accounted for 
almost 85% of the current account surplus in 
2006. The dominant role of net trade in China’s 
current account balance stands in sharp contrast 
to a share of only 37% in the case of Japan – 
another country to have recorded a high current 
account surplus in the same year, both in terms 
of level (USD 170 billion) and relative to GDP 
(3.9%). Conversely, the net income balance, 
which was only around 4% of China’s current 
account balance, represented more than 69% 
of Japan’s current account. Japan’s income 
account surplus of USD 118 billion in 2006 was 
one of the highest among developed economies 
and reﬂ   ected both the country’s large net 
foreign asset position and the high earnings on 
the country’s stock of portfolio investment. The 
different composition of the current account 
balances in the two countries, particularly the 
fact that China’s trade surplus in 2006 was 





















Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database for April 2007.
Chart 27 Cross section of net capital inflows 
and current account balance
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higher in absolute value than the overall current 
account surplus in Japan, may be one reason why 
China’s current account is generally viewed as a 
greater concern than Japan’s (see Chart 29).
A related issue is whether the increase in 
China’s trade surplus observed since 2005 
has been driven by cyclical factors and should 
be considered transitory in nature, or it has 
been underpinned by structural changes in the 
economy and is therefore likely to persist over 
time. Trade surpluses in excess of 7%-8% of 
GDP have only occurred recently in China. 
The rapid expansion of the Chinese trade 
surplus since 2005 has been mainly driven by 
a signiﬁ  cant slowdown in import growth, which 
has lagged behind export growth by a wide 
margin (see Chart 30). It has been argued that the 
deceleration in imports may have been a fallout 
of the policies implemented by the authorities 
since 2005 to slow the rapid growth of domestic 
investment. These policies may have affected 
the trade balance because of the high content 
of capital goods and machinery of Chinese 
imports. In this sense – the argument goes – 
China’s high trade surplus may be a transitory 
phenomenon linked to these policy changes and, 
in the medium term, the trade balance should be 
expected to return to levels more consistent with 
historical averages.
However, the evidence gathered lends mixed 
support to the hypothesis that policy measures to 
target investment may also have had an indirect 
dampening impact on imports, which in turn 
may have affected the trade balance. In favour of 
the hypothesis is the observation that the growth 
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rates of import volumes and real investment have 
been fairly correlated historically (see Chart 31). 
Against it, Chinese imports of machinery from 
developed economies – in particular the 
European Union, Japan and the United States – 
have continued to grow at fairly robust pace 
recently. Other policy measures that are intended 
to promote the establishment of national 
producers in sectors of the Chinese economy 
deemed strategically relevant (such as the steel 
and automobile manufacturing sectors) may also 
have had an indirect impact on net trade, 
dampening imports in those sectors.17 At the 
same time, the import slowdown may also be the 
result of a structural change in the Chinese 
economy. In particular, increased spending on 
research and development, technology transfers 
via FDI, joint ventures with foreign capital and 
the dissemination of knowledge through 
learning-by-doing may have resulted in the 
increased ability of Chinese ﬁ   rms to produce 
domestically parts and components that they 
used to import from abroad.
The processing trade still accounts for an 
important share of China’s total trade (see 
Chart 32). However, the evidence also suggests 
that China is moving away from its traditional 
role as an assembly platform of imported inputs 
for re-export and that Chinese producers have 
started to rely more on domestically sourced 
components, particularly for less sophisticated 
products. Cui and Syed (2006) argue that, as a 
result of these trends, China’s imports of parts 
and components have been increasingly driven 
by domestic production needs rather than ﬁ  nal 
demand abroad and that, as a result, imports and 
exports have decoupled recently. They conclude 
that this increased domestic sourcing may be 
one important factor behind the recent increase 
in China’s trade balance.
The key implication of this increased domestic 
sourcing of Chinese production and falling 
dependence of exports on imported inputs is that 
the surging trade surplus may reﬂ  ect structural 
changes in the Chinese economy. Thus, in the 
absence of any major policy change domestically 
and protectionist backlashes abroad, the trade 
surplus is likely to remain high also for the 
foreseeable future. Indeed, most external forecasts 
of China’s trade surplus are consistent with this 
view. The June 2007 Consensus Forecast, for 
example, projects a further widening of the trade 
surplus in the next two years (see Chart 30), and 
the IMF expects the current surplus to rise to 
10% of the country’s GDP in 2007 and 10.5% 
in 2008.18
The size of the capital account surplus and 
the composition of capital inﬂ  ows is a further 
peculiarity of China’s b.o.p. Chart 33 shows 
that steady net FDI inﬂ  ows of around USD 45 
billion per year over the past decade or so have 
been the country’s single most important form 
of external ﬁ  nancing. Conversely, net portfolio 
ﬂ  ows and other investment inﬂ  ows have been 
more volatile. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that net FDI inﬂ  ows were little affected 
in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, 
whereas other forms of ﬁ  nancing  recorded 
net outﬂ  ows during the period. FDI inﬂ  ows to 
Preferential policies towards local manufacturers include  17 
advantageous tax treatment and ﬁ  nancial support, preferential 
government procurement plans and intra-industry integration 
plans led by large state-owned enterprises. Speciﬁ  c policies are 
also planned at the municipal and regional levels.
See Statistical appendix of IMF  18  World Economic Outlook, April 
2006.
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China have also been important relative to other 
developing economies, given the country’s role 
as one of the world’s largest recipient of foreign 
investment. Over the past decade, China has 
absorbed around one-quarter of total FDI ﬂ  ows 
to emerging market economies and 70% of total 
FDI inﬂ  ows to emerging Asia (see Chart 34).
Turning to the most recent developments in 
China’s b.o.p., “other investment” inﬂ  ows  – 
which are probably mostly speculative in nature – 
rose sharply in 2004 but reversed the following 
year (see Chart 33). Overall net capital inﬂ  ows 
fell to a low of USD 7 billion in 2006, from 
USD 59 billion in the previous year, and a peak 
of USD 111 billion in 2004. The fall was largely 
due to net portfolio outﬂ  ows of USD 58 billion, 
reportedly associated with the accumulation of 
external assets by domestic banks ﬂ  ush  with 
liquidity. Since, under the existing regulations 
on capital movements, outward ﬂ  ows are only 
allowed subject to a number of restrictions (see 
also Table 1), the large size of these portfolio 
outﬂ  ows in 2006 suggests that they may have 
been partly encouraged by the authorities in an 
effort to reduce the overall b.o.p. surplus and 
ease appreciation pressures on the currency. A 
moderation in external borrowing and a levelling 
off in net FDI inﬂ  ows also contributed to the 
sharp slowdown in overall net capital inﬂ  ows
in 2006.
Preliminary data suggest that the sharp 
slowdown in net capital inﬂ  ows in 2006 may 
have already reversed in the ﬁ  rst half of 2007. 
Gross FDI inﬂ  ows rose by around 12% in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2007, compared with the same period 
a year earlier. Other b.o.p. ﬂ  ows that are not 
related to FDI and to the trade balance rose even 
more sharply in the ﬁ  rst half of 2007, to USD 
122 billion, compared with only USD 33 billion 
in the same period of 2006, suggesting that 
short-term capital inﬂ  ows may have also picked 
up signiﬁ  cantly over the period. Expectations 
of faster renminbi appreciation, combined with 
soaring equity and property prices in some 
cities, are possibly important drivers behind 
these inﬂ  ows. Clearly, if these trends continue 
in the second half of the year, overall capital 
inﬂ  ows in 2007 are likely to surpass the record 
levels last observed in 2004.
The composition of China’s foreign capital 
inﬂ   ows and, in particular, the dominance of 
FDI within these inﬂ  ows should be seen in the 
light of the existing capital controls, which 
are particularly restrictive compared with 
other major emerging market economies. A 
quick overview of these controls is reported 
in Table 1, which uses a simple colour 
code to indicate the extent of the existing 
regulations on speciﬁ   c classes of ﬁ  nancial 
assets. The table highlights that the extent of 
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these controls varies signiﬁ  cantly,  depending 
on the type of assets and, in some cases, 
the  ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ   nancial nature of the 
enterprise. Without going into the details of 
the regulations, the asymmetric nature of these 
controls is immediately apparent, with outward 
ﬂ   ows generally more heavily regulated than 
inward  ﬂ   ows. Furthermore, controls are still 
signiﬁ  cantly asymmetric today, despite several 
attempts to ease restrictions on outward ﬂ  ows 
over time. Outward FDI, for example, was 
liberalised between 2001 and the end of 2004, 
whereas inward FDI was liberalised in several 
steps as long ago as the mid-1980s (Prasad et al, 
2005). Additionally, the less restrictive regime 
for portfolio investment outﬂ  ows highlighted in 
the table reﬂ  ects mainly the recent introduction 
of a pilot scheme to allow Chinese residents to 
purchase foreign securities through the so-called 
Qualiﬁ   ed Domestic Institutional Investors 
programme. Under this programme, however, 
purchases of foreign assets by (selected) 
Chinese residents still require administrative 
approvals and are subject to overall targets set 
annually by the authorities. Until recently, these 
targets were set to relatively low levels.
Within inward ﬂ  ows, FDI is the class of cross-
border capital movements least subject to 
restrictions, compared with portfolio investment 
and foreign debt. The relatively favourable 
treatment granted to inward FDI has to be seen 
in the light of the beneﬁ   ts that are normally 
associated with this form of external ﬁ  nancing. 
FDI inﬂ  ows into China are typically credited to 
have favoured technology transfers, increased 
domestic competition and raised factor 
productivity. They have brought capital goods 
and knowledge, which in turn have helped the 
country to develop its productive capacity. 
Moreover, FDI has been an important source 
of capital, which has contributed to ﬁ  nance 
the strong investment expansion that has 
characterised China’s growth patterns in recent 
decades.
In order to attract more foreign investment, 
foreign invested companies in China until 
recently also enjoyed tax breaks and a 
preferential tax treatment relative to domestically 
funded ﬁ  rms. These practices were discontinued 
in March 2007 but, combined with the relatively 
more liberal approach to FDI ﬂ  ows under the 
existing capital controls, they may have been 
Table 1 Capital controls in China
 FREE: no particular requirements or ex  post registration requirements
 LIMITED: allowed either to authorised institutions/enterprises only or subject to a number of exceptions
 RESTRICTED: either prohibited with some exceptions or requiring particular procedures for examination and approval











Foreign debt Bonds, other debt 



















(Fin. sector) n.a. n.a.




Occasional Paper No 82
March 2008
important factors explaining why these inﬂ  ows 
have been so conspicuous in recent years.
FDI inﬂ  ows to China amounted to USD 55 billion 
in 2006. A decomposition of these inﬂ  ows  by 
country of origin shows that around 57% of the 
total came from Hong Kong and the Virgin Islands 
(see Chart 35). The status of off-shore ﬁ  nancial 
centres typically attached to these regions suggests 
that a substantial part of the ﬂ  ows  originating 
there are presumably round-tripping – i.e. they are 
Chinese capital channelled abroad and then back 
into the country in the form of FDI in order to take 
advantage of preferential tax treatment offered to 
foreign-invested companies. Getting exact 
estimates of the relevance of this phenomenon is 
extremely difﬁ   cult, although it is believed that 
much of this round-tripping takes place through 
Hong Kong.19 If this is the case, an upper-bound 
estimate is that a share of around one-third of all 
FDI inﬂ   ows to China may be due to round-
tripping. Of the remaining reported FDI inﬂ  ows, 
two-thirds originates from Asian countries. 
Importantly, developed economies as a whole 
have not been particularly large investors in China 
thus far, and their ownership of Chinese assets is 
generally limited. This conclusion stands true 
regardless of whether one corrects or not for 
round-tripping (see Chart 35).
Partly offsetting these inﬂ  ows, China’s b.o.p. has 
historically recorded large errors and omissions, 
which may be indicative of unrecorded capital 
outﬂ   ows from the private sector. This is a 
common feature in many developing countries, 
especially those where capital account restrictions 
are in place, as domestic residents try and 
circumvent these controls. In these circumstances, 
large negative outﬂ   ows under the errors and 
omissions category are typically indicative of 
unrecorded capital ﬂ   ights, associated with the 
high risk of expropriation in the home country 
and unsophisticated domestic ﬁ  nancial markets. 
In China, outﬂ   ows under this category were 
particularly large between 1995 and 2000, 
suggesting that, if capital restrictions were not in 
place, the country could have suffered much 
higher outﬂ   ows. Errors and omissions turned 
positive in 2003 and 2004, possibly reﬂ  ecting a 
reversal of capital ﬂ   ight owing to speculation 
about a possible revaluation of the renminbi. 
However, they switched back into outﬂ  ows again 
in 2005 and 2006. It has been suggested that 
errors and omissions may reﬂ  ect, at least in part, 
accounting issues related to the valuation in US 
dollars of the reported stock of foreign debt and 
 FDI ﬂ  ows from the Virgin Islands are generally thought to  19 
be capital ﬂ   ows that have their original source in developed 
economies such as Japan, Taiwan and the United States, which 
are channelled through this off-shore centre in order to elude 
taxation in the source economy.
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valuation effects on reserves from the unadjusted errors and 
omissions. These are estimated by comparing the reserves stock 
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ofﬁ  cial reserves. However, even if one corrects 
for an – admittedly crude – estimate of such 
valuation effects, the overall picture would 
remain broadly unchanged (see Chart 36).20
5.2  THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
Years of b.o.p. surpluses have led to the build-
up of large stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
in China’s i.i.p. The rapidity with which 
such large stocks have developed has been 
remarkable. Gross foreign assets have grown 
rapidly, boosted by the continued accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. An “open-door” 
policy to foreign investment – particularly 
FDI – has also led to the accumulation of 
signiﬁ  cant gross external liabilities. As external 
assets have grown faster than liabilities, China 
has developed a large net foreign asset position 
and the country has turned into a net supplier 
of capital to the rest of the world – an unusual 
position for an emerging economy. Moreover, 
as a high proportion of the country’s stock of 
external assets are foreign exchange reserves 
held in US dollars, China has also become an 
important source of ﬁ  nancing of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit.
Table 2 reports China’s ofﬁ  cial i.i.p. at the end 
of 2006, as issued by the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange – the country’s key 
foreign exchange institution.21 However, 
ofﬁ   cial estimates of China’s i.i.p. are only 
available starting from 2004. Thus, to get 
a broader perspective of the evolution of 
the country’s foreign assets and liabilities 
since market-oriented reforms started being 
implemented in the late 1970s, this section 
also provides an in-house estimate for the 
years prior to 2004 by cumulating ﬂ  ows from 
the b.o.p. and applying appropriate valuation 
adjustments on the resulting stocks. In doing 
this, we follow a methodology ﬁ  rst developed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, and 2006), 
to whom we refer the interested reader for the 
The point was raised originally by Prasad et al (2005). China’s  20 
ofﬁ  cially reported holdings of foreign bonds are marked at the 
historical exchange rate, while the stock of ofﬁ  cial reserves is 
marked to market and hence does reﬂ   ect currency valuation 
effects. This implies that any changes in the US dollar value of 
reserve holdings could end up in the balance of payments under 
the errors and omissions category. The adjusted series reported 
in Chart 36 is obtained by subtracting from the unadjusted series 
an estimate of valuation effects on reserves, which in turn are 
obtained by comparing the reserves stock as declared by the 
People’s Bank of China (which is adjusted for valuation effects) 
with the series derived from cumulating balance of payment 
ﬂ  ows (which excludes such valuation effects).
Ofﬁ  cial estimates of China’s i.i.p. were ﬁ  rst issued in mid-2006. 21 
Table 2 China’s official international investment position for 2006
(USD billions)
Assets % Liabilities %
FDI assets 82.4 5.1 FDI liabilities 544.2 56.4
Portfolio investment, assets 229.2 14.1 Portfolio investment, liabilities 120.7 12.5
 - Equity securities 1.5 0.1 - Equity securities 106.5 11.0
 - Debt securities 227.8 14.0 - Debt securities 14.2 1.5
Other investment, assets 242.0 14.9 Other investment, liabilities 299.6 31.1
 - Bank loans and trade credit 230.5 14.2 - Bank loans and trade credit 261.4 27.1
 - Other investment assets 11.6 0.7 - Other investment liabilities 38.2 4.0
Gross international reserves 1,072.9 66.0 Other liabilities 0.0 0.0
Total assets 1,626.6 100.0 Total liabililties 964.5 100.0
NFA 662.1
Memo:
GDP in USD bn in 2006 2,630.1
Net foreign assets/GDP (percentage) 25.2
Sources: State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China, IMF World Economic Outlook database for April 2007.40
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technical details. However, unlike Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2006) – who also provide an 
historical i.i.p. database for over 140 countries, 
including China – we draw the underlying 
Chinese b.o.p. data for the i.i.p. estimate from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook database 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti combine data from 
a variety of sources) and produce estimates 
of China’s external assets and liabilities for 
the period 1980-2006 (the database provided 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti stops in 2004). 
We also attempt a more accurate estimate of 
valuation changes on the stock of external debt 
using data on the currency composition of the 
long-term debt stock taken from the World 
Bank Global Development Finance database. 
Moreover, we provide a detailed breakdown 
of gross assets and liabilities and present an 
estimate of unrecorded assets held abroad by 
Chinese residents, obtained by cumulating 
error and omission ﬂ  ows from the b.o.p. and 
adjusting for valuation changes on the stocks of 
foreign debt and ofﬁ  cial reserves. According to 
these estimates, unrecorded assets held abroad 
by Chinese residents were signiﬁ  cant in 2006 
(USD 168 billion, or 6.4% of GDP). Table A.1 
in the appendix reports the full estimates of 
China’s external balance sheet obtained with 
this method. Reassuringly, these estimated 
stocks are broadly comparable with those 
from ofﬁ  cial data for the period in which the 
two measures overlap, both in gross and in net 
terms – except for minor differences concerning 
mainly the breakdown of gross assets and 
liabilities by type of ﬁ  nancial instrument.
This information can be used to highlight a 
number of important features of China’s i.i.p., 
both in static terms and in terms of its evolution 
over time. First, China displays relatively large 
stock positions, both in absolute value and as a 
share of GDP. Gross foreign assets were almost 
USD 1,627 billion in 2006 (62% of the country’s 
GDP) and gross foreign liabilities were USD 965 
billion (see Table 2). These large stocks have 
grown very rapidly from a relatively low base and 
in a fairly short period of time. To illustrate this 
point, Chart 37 reports a cross-country comparison 
of an indicator of ﬁ  nancial openness, deﬁ  ned as 
the sum of gross foreign assets and liabilities as 
a share of GDP. This indicator has risen sharply 
in China in the past 15 years, from only 34% in 




























Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006) and authors’ calculations.
1) Calculated as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a 
share of GDP. Emerging Asia includes India, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Latin America 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
Eastern Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland.
2) The last observation refers to 2006.
Chart 38 Financial integration, trade 
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database for April 2007, 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and authors’ calculations.
1) Calculated as the sum of China’s foreign assets and liabilities 
divided by the sum of world total foreign assets and liabilities.
2) Calculated as the sum of China’s exports and imports of 
goods and services divided by the sum of world total imports 
and exports in goods and services.
3) Calculated as the share of China’s GDP in world total GDP 
in current prices in US dollars.41
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1990 to almost 130% in 2006, and has shown 
a particularly sharp acceleration since 2000. 
China’s ﬁ  nancial openness today is comparable 
to the level in other emerging market economies, 
although it is still relatively low when compared 
with the G7. Furthermore, as highlighted also in 
Lane and Schmukler (2006), while the growth 
in cross-border holdings of assets and liabilities 
has been remarkable in China, the relative pace 
of ﬁ  nancial integration – measured by the share 
of Chinese foreign assets and liabilities in total 
world assets and liabilities – has lagged behind 
the pace of trade integration – measured by the 
sum of China’s exports and imports relative to the 
world’s total – and the growth in China’s share of 
global GDP (see Chart 38).
Table 2 also shows that there are signiﬁ  cant 
asymmetries in the composition of the underlying 
stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities. 
In particular, the vast majority of China’s 
external assets consist of debt-type instruments 
(around 94%, if one counts debt securities, bank 
loans, trade credit and ofﬁ  cial reserves, which 
presumably are invested mainly in government 
bonds), whereas equity-type instruments 
(portfolio investment and FDI) represent only 6% 
of the total. Conversely, equity-type instruments 
account for around 72% of total liabilities, with 
debt-type instruments accounting for 28%. 
Thus, in terms of net position in each asset 
category, China has a positive net debt position 
and a negative net equity position, or, borrowing 
from Lane and Schmukler (2006), China is 
“long in debt and short in equity”. Although 
this position does not highlight any obvious 
external vulnerability, the fact that equity-type 
instruments on average yield higher income 
streams than debt-type instruments could be one 
important factor explaining the relatively low net 
income balance of China’s current account when 
compared with other countries. In 2006, the net 
income balance as a share of net foreign assets 
(a measure of the implicit interest rate earned 
by Chinese residents on their net i.i.p. holdings) 
was only 1.8%. In Japan and in Germany – two 
countries with large net foreign asset positions – 
the measure was 6.4% and 3.9% respectively (see 
Table 3). In gross terms, the implicit remuneration 
paid by China on its gross liabilities is broadly 
comparable to that in Germany, but the average 
remuneration on the stock of foreign assets has 
been consistently lower than in both Germany 
and Japan (see Table 3). This suggests that the 
low remuneration on foreign assets (particularly 
the low interests accrued on China’s huge 
reserves stock) is an important factor explaining 
the relatively low income balance.
A further notable feature of China’s i.i.p. is the 
high share of reserves in total foreign assets, both 
in absolute terms and relative to other countries, 
or, conversely, the low share of non-reserve 
assets in total assets (see Chart 39). Foreign 
exchange reserves accounted for around two-
thirds of total foreign assets in 2006. This is an 
unusually high proportion, even when compared 
with other countries with large foreign exchange 
reserves holdings such as Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan (see Chart 40). Among large 
reserve holders, only India has a higher share of 
reserve assets than China. Within non-reserve 
assets, the low stock of FDI assets (USD 82 
billion) implies that, despite the recent increases 
in FDI outﬂ   ows from the country, Chinese 
companies still remain relatively small global 
Table 3 Implicit remuneration of external position
(as a percentage)
Japan Germany China
2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004 2006 2005 2004
Net income balance/net foreign assets1) 6.4 6.3 5.0 3.9 4.9 4.8 1.8 2.5 -1.2
Income credit/gross foreign assets 3.5 3.1 2.8 4.1 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.2 2.2
Income debit/gross foreign liabilities 1.6 1.3 1.2 4.1 3.9 3.4 4.1 3.5 3.8
Source: authors’ calculations.
1) A negative value indicates a net interest outﬂ  ow.42
ECB
Occasional Paper No 82
March 2008
investors and account for less than 1% of the 
total world FDI stock. Furthermore, the stock of 
foreign assets held directly by the Chinese state 
may be even higher than suggested by the simple 
share of 66% of ofﬁ   cial reserves in foreign 
assets, because part of the non-reserve assets are 
actually foreign investments ultimately owned 
by state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
commercial banks.
Turning to foreign liabilities, China combines a 
low level of external debt (USD 316 billion in 
2006) and, within this, a relatively small share 
of short-term debt. Since 2000 short-term debt 
has increased threefold, to USD 159 billion in 
2006, but remains still comfortably covered 
by the stock of ofﬁ  cial reserves. Conversely, 
the large stock of FDI liabilities (USD 544 
billion in 2006) makes up the lion’s share 
of the country’s gross external liabilities 
(see Chart 41).
Furthermore, following years of balance of 
payment surpluses, China’s net i.i.p. balance 
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has been positive since 2003, indicating that 
the country is a net lender to the rest of the 
world (see Chart 42) – an unusual position for a 
country that is still relatively poor and where the 
ratio of capital-to-labour is low (see Chart 43).
Net foreign assets were USD 662 billion in 
2006, equivalent to around 25% of the country’s 
GDP. This large net foreign asset position was 
sharply up from the USD 423 billion in the 
previous year and is currently one of the largest 
in the world (see Table 4).
Finally, China also presents a large stock of 
unrecorded assets abroad – as measured by 
cumulating errors and omissions from the b.o.p. 
ﬂ   ows and adjusting for valuation changes in 
the stocks of external debt and ofﬁ  cial reserves 
(see Chart 44). According to this measure, 
unrecorded assets abroad have fallen somewhat 
in recent years, particularly in 2004 and 2005, 
owing to a reversal of unrecorded outﬂ  ows 
reportedly attributed to expectations of currency 
appreciations. However, the overall stock still 
remains relatively high at around 6.4% of the 
country’s GDP.
Overall, this analysis highlights ﬁ  ve  striking 
features of China’s i.i.p.: i) a relatively low level 
of ﬁ  nancial integration with the global economy, 
which has lagged behind trade integration; 
ii) a large net foreign asset position, which is 
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Table 4 Major net creditor and debtor countries in 2006
(US dollar billions)
Japan 1,806.34 United States -2,539.63
Germany 738.75 Spain -752.00
China 662.10 Australia -480.27
Hong Kong 532.15 Mexico1) -349.04
Switzerland 459.15 Brazil1) -328.99
United Arab Emirates2) 221.38 United Kingdom -520.60
Norway1) 201.42 Korea -212.66
France1) 193.43 Greece -237.07
Saudi Arabia2) 159.83 Turkey -169.28
Belgium1) 119.56 Canada -91.64
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difﬁ  cult to reconcile with the country’s relative 
factor endowment and level of development; iii) 
the absolute predominance of foreign exchange 
reserves – and symmetrically the relatively small 
weight of non-reserve assets – in total foreign 
assets, which ultimately implies a concentration 
of foreign assets in the public sector, either 
directly by the government or indirectly 
through state-owned ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
enterprises; iv) the prevalence of FDI in gross 
foreign liabilities and the relatively low stock 
of external debt, particularly short-term debt; 
and v) a signiﬁ  cant amount of unrecorded assets 
held abroad by Chinese residents.
5.3 IMPLICATIONS
The features of China’s i.i.p. discussed in the 
previous section have important implications 
for the country’s external creditworthiness, the 
optimality of returns on Chinese foreign wealth, 
its vulnerability to external ﬁ  nancial  shocks 
(exchange rate changes and shifts in the US 
yield curve), the exposure of foreign investors 
to domestic shocks in China, and the country’s 
future prospects for ﬁ  nancial integration.
From the point of view of sovereign 
creditworthiness, China’s external credit proﬁ  le 
is extremely healthy, supported by the large net 
creditor i.i.p. of 25% of GDP, strong balance of 
payment surpluses, prudent levels of external 
debt, including short-term debt, a comfortable 
stock of foreign exchange reserves and a high 
stock of FDI liabilities, which are typically 
considered a safer form of external ﬁ  nancing 
than debt-type liabilities. This strong external 
position is also reﬂ  ected in the country’s high 
sovereign ratings, which typically outperform 
those of most other emerging market peers. 
Indeed, a recent report by Fitch, the ratings 
agency, argued that, on a comparative basis, 
among the 13 rated sovereigns with gross 
external assets of more than USD 1 trillion at 
the end of 2006, nine were rated “AAA”. 
China’s “A” rating was unique in this group in 
that ofﬁ   cial reserves account for the vast 
majority of gross external assets, whereas 
sovereigns at the top of the rating scale tend to 
have much lower stocks of reserves.22 Concerns 
about future developments of China’s external 
ﬁ   nancial position, should capital account 
restrictions be lifted, were quoted as a potential 
obstacle towards a higher rating.
But is the prevailing composition of China’s i.i.p. 
also desirable from the perspective of the Chinese 
policy-maker? In particular, how should one 
see the fact that the majority of China’s foreign 
assets are owned by the state? The usefulness 
of a large stock of reserves is that essentially it 
allows the smoothing of domestic absorption in 
response to external payment imbalances. For 
countries with rigid exchange rate regimes, an 
added beneﬁ  t is that reserve accumulation may 
be used to stabilise the foreign exchange rate 
in the face of appreciation pressures. In China, 
the large stock of reserves can also be taken 
as a sign of latent demand in the economy for 
foreign assets, which cannot be satisﬁ  ed directly 
by private agents because of the existing capital 
account restrictions, and which consequently 
has to be intermediated by the central bank. 
However, investing national wealth is not a 
typical mandate of a central bank. Central banks 
are, by deﬁ   nition, risk-adverse institutions 
that seek to maximise portfolio liquidity and 
therefore invest in low-risk assets yielding low 
returns. Thus, because of these constraints, it 
is not assured that China’s external position is 
on an optimal risk-return trade-off. Moreover, 
by absorbing all the foreign exchange proceeds 
ﬂ  owing into the economy by means of ofﬁ  cial 
intervention, the central bank is effectively 
providing a hedge to the rest of the economy 
against foreign exchange movements. This 
implies a concentration of foreign exchange risk 
on the balance sheet of the monetary authority, 
which leaves private agents unprepared to deal 
with such risks appropriately and delays the 
development of more sophisticated hedging 
instruments.
In this regard, the recent announcement of a 
plan to fundamentally reform China’s foreign 
See China’s External Assets, Special Report by Fitch Ratings  22 
(20 March 2007), available online at: http://www.ﬁ  tchratings.
com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=319022.45
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reserve administration and to establish a 
sovereign wealth fund with responsibility for 
managing more actively part of China’s stock 
of foreign exchange reserves may be taken as 
an indication by the Chinese authorities that 
the current arrangement is sub-optimal. In 
particular, the move reveals a clear desire to earn 
greater returns on ofﬁ  cial reserves and to hold a 
more diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of foreign assets. As 
we discussed in the previous section, China’s 
(gross) foreign assets generated an average 
return of only 3.2% in 2006. If a more diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolio of foreign assets led to a 50-basis point 
increase in these returns to 3.7% (which would 
still be lower than the average return of 4.1% in 
Germany in the same year; see Table 3), the net 
income balance would mechanically increase 
by USD 8.9 billion, adding – ceteris paribus – 
a further 0.3 percentage point of GDP to the 
current account surplus. In other words, the 
potential income stream from China’s external 
assets provides a strong incentive to seek higher 
returns.
In addition to enhancing returns, a more 
diversiﬁ  ed international portfolio would also help 
to reduce the vulnerability of China’s foreign 
assets to external ﬁ  nancial shocks. Ofﬁ  cial data 
on the currency and instrument composition 
of China’s reserve stock are not available, but 
from US data on purchases of US government 
bonds by foreign investors it is possible to 
reconstruct that a large fraction of these reserves 
is likely invested in US government bonds. This 
concentration of foreign assets currently exposes 
the country to the risk of a shift in the US yield 
curve, which could reduce the mark-to-market 
value of these treasury instruments. Similarly, 
a renminbi appreciation against the US dollar 
would result in a fall in the local-currency value 
of these instruments.
Conversely, the level and composition of 
foreign liabilities provides a rough indication 
of the vulnerability of foreign investors to 
domestic shocks in China. In this regard, the 
high share of FDI and the low share of external 
debt in China’s foreign liabilities leave foreign 
investors mainly exposed to macroeconomic, 
expropriation and political risk, whereas foreign 
investors’ exposures to Chinese credit risk are 
relatively limited.46
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6  WHAT EXPLAINS CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT POSITION?
Several arguments have been put forward to 
explain the size and composition of China’s 
i.i.p.. In this section we critically review the 
literature on the determinants of capital ﬂ  ows 
and verify to what extent it can be adapted to the 
current situation in China. With respect to the 
stylised facts highlighted in the previous section, 
each model, unsurprisingly, reveals one part 
of the jigsaw, but none of them in isolation is 
sufﬁ  cient to give the full picture. Nevertheless, 
combining the different explanations helps 
us understand the pattern and composition of 
capital ﬂ  ows to China.
China’s large net foreign asset position is at 
odds with the predictions of the neoclassical 
theory. A country where the capital-to-labour 
ratio is relatively low should enjoy high returns 
on capital and, with increasingly integrated 
ﬁ   nancial markets, receive net capital inﬂ  ows. 
Capital should ﬂ   ow from rich countries (the 
north) to poor countries (the south), and the 
process should continue until the return on 
investment is equalised in all countries. In 
practice, this is not the case. The fact that the 
direction of capital ﬂ  ows is not in line with the 
prediction of neoclassical theory has become 
known as the “Lucas Paradox” (see Lucas, 
1990). China ﬁ  ts the paradox well: by structural 
endowment, it is a candidate net international 
borrower, but in fact it is a net lender. 
Distortions, such as ﬁ  nancial restrictions, and 
scarcity of complementary factors to capital, i.e. 
weak institutions and limited human capital, 
decrease returns on capital and prevent China 
from being a net lender.23
The model by Kraay et al (2005), for example, 
is one attempt to explain the Lucas paradox 
within the neoclassical framework. The model 
has three key ingredients: diminishing returns, 
production risk and sovereign risk. The ﬁ  rst 
two factors create strong incentives to spread 
capital across countries. In the absence of 
countervailing forces, the model would predict 
very large capital ﬂ  ows moving from the north 
to the south, at least of an order of magnitude 
greater than what we observe in reality. 
The third ingredient provides the necessary 
countervailing force to bring the predictions of 
the theory in line with the ﬂ  ows that we observe 
in reality. In this model, sovereign risk acts as 
a friction so that beneﬁ  cial trade opportunities 
are left unexploited. Dollar and Kraay (2006) 
calibrate a version of this model on Chinese 
data but ﬁ  nd that, for reasonable values of the 
underlying parameters, the model is unable 
to replicate a net foreign asset position of the 
size observed in China. In fact, even assuming 
extreme doses of sovereign risk, the model will 
still predict a net borrower position for China 
because productivity is sufﬁ  ciently high to make 
investment proﬁ  table in the model.
Of course, other frictions not explicitly 
mentioned in the simple theoretical framework 
of Kraay et al (2005) may be at play. For 
example, Dollar and Kraay (2006) argue that 
China’s strict capital controls could have played 
an important role in shaping its positive i.i.p. 
They develop a simple empirical framework 
to formally test this hypothesis, but ﬁ  nd  that 
the model is also unable to replicate China’s 
actual net foreign asset position and conclude 
that, taken in isolation, capital controls are not 
sufﬁ  cient to explain this position in the case of 
China.
Dooley, Garber and Folkerts-Landau (2004a 
and 2004b) suggest an alternative view, known 
as the mercantilist hypothesis, to explain why 
the largest share of capital inﬂ   ows in China 
is constituted by FDI. The argument goes as 
follows. Foreign companies are attracted by 
a large pool of relatively cheap labour and 
an artiﬁ   cially undervalued exchange rate. At 
the same time FDI renders the export sector 
internationally competitive. FDI is ultimately the 
In a systematic empirical study that aims to evaluate the role  23 
of alternative explanations behind the Lucas paradox, Alfaro, 
Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2007) show that, for the period 
1970-2000 and for a large set of developing, emerging and 
mature economies, low quality of institution is the main reason 
for the paradox. See also Gelos and Wei (2005) and Caselli and 
Fryer (2007) for further references on factors complementary to 
capital.47
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6   WHAT  EXPLAINS 
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT POSITION?
main engine of an export-led growth paradigm. 
In this context, China’s massive accumulation 
of foreign reserves (especially in the form of 
US government bonds) constitutes an insurance 
for foreign companies investing in the country. 
Although appealing, the hypothesis of Dooley 
et al (2004a and 2004b) suffers from at least 
three drawbacks. First, an export-led growth 
model based on permanent inﬂ  ows of FDI and a 
constantly undervalued exchange rate cannot be 
sustained forever. Second, FDI alone represents 
only a small fraction of less than 5% of total 
investment in China. Third, most FDI inﬂ  ows 
originate in countries that export to China (rather 
than importing from it). With reference to the 
ﬁ  ve features of China’s i.i.p. highlighted in the 
previous section, the mercantilist hypothesis 
does not explain China’s large net foreign asset 
position, its low external debt, or why barriers 
to capital outﬂ  ows are eluded.
The pragmatic strategy that prevailed in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis may also 
have played an important role in determining 
this situation. In the early stages of reform, 
the Chinese authorities preferred FDI to more 
volatile forms of capital inﬂ  ows. Later on, the 
government gradually relaxed restrictions on 
foreign borrowing by corporations and in the 
mid-1990s declared its intention to implement 
capital account convertibility by 2000. However, 
during the Asian crisis, Chinese policy-makers 
perceived non-FDI capital inﬂ   ows as one of 
the major culprits of the turmoil and therefore 
abandoned their intention of liberalising the 
capital account by 2000, focussing instead on 
reserve accumulation for precautionary purposes. 
This pragmatic approach may explain why 
China has accumulated large foreign reserves 
over time, why capital inﬂ  ows are heavily tilted 
towards FDI, why external debt is relatively 
low, and even why the Chinese private sector 
appears to hold large stocks of unrecorded assets 
abroad. However, the pragmatic approach does 
not explain why China, which is a catching-up 
country short of capital, is in fact a net lender 
rather than a net borrower internationally. 
Moreover, although capital controls may 
discourage outward capital movements by 
Chinese residents, ﬁ  nancial investment can be 
channelled to domestic assets. After all, exporting 
capital abroad in the presence of barriers is 
costly, and only if investment opportunities at 
home are missing and/or there are sufﬁ  ciently 
high incentives abroad are domestic investors 
willing to bear these costs.
The peculiar structure of China’s i.i.p. can 
also be interpreted in the light of the studies 
by Caballero (2006), Caballero, Farhi and 
Gourinchas (2006), Stulz (2005) and Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002) on the role of (economic) 
institutions. Economic institutions, such as the 
structure of property rights and the presence of 
well-functioning markets, provide the necessary 
conditions for investing in physical and human 
capital and contribute to an efﬁ  cient allocation 
of resources (see Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2005).
Caballero (2006) suggests an intriguing analysis. 
The key idea is that there is an imperfect link 
between the capital’s ability to produce output 
and its ability to generate ﬁ  nancial assets. The 
higher the capacity to produce output, the more 
valuable the underlying capital. However, the 
possibility of selling rights over that output in 
advance, i.e. the generation of ﬁ  nancial assets, is 
related to institutional factors. While countries 
such as the United States have been able to match 
sound growth conditions with an unrivalled 
ability to create high quality ﬁ  nancial  assets, 
emerging economies may enjoy high growth 
but are not typically able to generate assets 
that appeal to international investors. China 
is a case in point. The country is experiencing 
rapid economic growth, but it is not able to sell 
rights over that output in international ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Like any other fast-growing economy, 
China shows an increasing demand for ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, which it does not supply. If capital 
was free to move internationally, domestic 
investors would satisfy their appetite by buying 
foreign assets. Owing to the restrictions on 
China’s capital account, the central bank 
provides assets to domestic investors in the form 
of sterilisation bonds, which are collateralised 
with its massive international reserves.48
ECB
Occasional Paper No 82
March 2008
In the same vein, Caballero et al (2006) explain 
the pattern observed in global capital ﬂ  ows in 
terms of the ability of certain regions to supply 
high-quality  ﬁ   nancial instruments and the 
inability of other regions to do so. Some fast-
growth economies such as China do not seem 
able to generate local store of value instruments. 
Their demand for saving instruments is then 
satisﬁ   ed abroad, notably in Europe and the 
United States. Higher growth potential in the 
United States attracts a larger share of global 
savings to that country.
Stulz (2005) focuses more on investors’ 
protection and argues that the predictions of 
the neoclassical theory are not supported by the 
evidence from developing countries because of 
the so-called twin agency problems. Although 
the marginal productivity of capital is higher in 
emerging markets than in developed economies, 
the cumulative sum of net equity ﬂ  ows to less 
developed countries from 1996 to 2004 is 
negative. This paradox can be explained by 
the so-called twin agency problems, i.e. poor 
corporate governance and high political risk, 
which prevent the providers of capital from 
fully accruing their investment returns. The 
agency problem exists at ﬁ  rm and state level, 
since corporate insiders and state rulers consume 
private beneﬁ   ts. An entrepreneur becomes a 
corporate insider when he takes advantage of 
his unique investment opportunity, starts a ﬁ  rm 
and sells equities to outside investors. In a world 
where the twin agency problems do not exist, 
the cash ﬂ  ow would be paid out to portfolio 
investors in proportion to their agreed-upon 
rights. However, with the twin agency problems, 
since the corporate insiders manage the ﬁ  rms 
they have the opportunity to expropriate cash 
ﬂ  ow ﬁ  rst. The rulers of the sovereign state can 
expropriate cash ﬂ  ow subsequently. The cash 
ﬂ   ow remaining after these appropriations is 
distributed as liquidating dividend.
In the same vein, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002) develop a model where countries with 
relatively better shareholder protection have 
more developed stock markets, larger and more 
valuable  ﬁ   rms, a lower diversion of proﬁ  ts 
and higher dividends, and lower ownership 
concentration. When the model is applied to 
capital  ﬂ   ows from rich to poor countries, it 
explains why these ﬂ  ows are limited.
While the models by Caballero (2006), 
Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006), Stulz 
(2005) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
explain why China is a net lender rather than a 
net borrower (contrary to what the neo-classical 
theory would suggest), they are silent about 
the composition of these capital ﬂ  ows. Lack of 
sound institutions at home justify why domestic 
savings are invested abroad and why this occurs 
via the central bank. In addition to barriers to 
capital ﬂ  ows, ﬁ  nancial intermediaries in China 
would not yet be prepared to invest abroad and 
bear the associated currency risk. The share of 
savings that escapes the authorities’ control is 
then included in the relatively large errors and 
omissions of China’s b.o.p. Within this strand 
of literature, it remains to be explained why 
FDI constitutes a relatively large share of total 
liabilities.
Ju and Wei (2006) analyse the issue. While 
previous research lumps together ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and property rights protection, Ju and 
Wei (2006) make a clear distinction between the 
two. They point out that the return on ﬁ  nancial 
investment is not the same as the return on 
physical investment. Financial investors obtain 
only a fraction of the return on physical capital, 
since they have to share it with entrepreneurs 
and perhaps with government ofﬁ  cials (Stulz, 
2005). When ﬁ   nancial systems become more 
developed, investors enjoy a larger fraction of the 
return on (physical) capital. Nevertheless, a low-
cost country with an underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial 
system but where property rights are sufﬁ  ciently 
guaranteed can experience an inﬂ  ow of foreign 
investment, even though, at the same time, it 
may exhibit ﬁ   nancial capital outﬂ  ows.  This 
occurs since a relatively low level of ﬁ  nancial 
development results in lower interest rates and, 
therefore, outﬂ  ows of ﬁ  nancial capital. At the 
same time, low wages render the country an 
attractive location for foreign investment. Low 
expropriation risk ensures that these investment 49
ECB
Occasional Paper No 82
March 2008
6   WHAT  EXPLAINS 
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT POSITION?
opportunities are not left unexploited. China is 
again a case in point. Its ﬁ  nancial institutions are 
underdeveloped and unable to generate sufﬁ  cient 
quantity of good quality ﬁ  nancial assets. This 
creates ﬁ  nancial outﬂ  ows that take the form of 
a large accumulation of foreign reserves since 
the private sector has limited possibilities of 
investing abroad (errors and omissions in the 
b.o.p. are a further channel of capital outﬂ  ows). 
At the same time, China encourages FDI 
inﬂ  ows, which are facilitated by relatively low 
wages, and a variety of protective measures and 
incentives given to foreign investors willing to 
invest in the country.
All in all, institutions in a broad sense have 
been an important determinant of the size 
and composition of China’s i.i.p. However, 
institutions are endogenous to the society 
that generates them and are the expression of 
tensions among different interest groups whose 
goals may conﬂ  ict with one another. Therefore 
institutions change over time, reshaping the 
economic landscape of a country. The next 
section brieﬂ  y discusses how institutions have 
evolved over time in China and their impact 
on the current economic developments. It also 
presents an assessment of the future direction of 
capital ﬂ  ows in China.
6.1  INSTITUTIONS AND CAPITAL FLOWS:
POST-WWII TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
The current economic position of China, 
including its peculiar b.o.p. and i.i.p. structure, 
can be analysed through the lens of the recent 
literature on institutions (see, for instance, 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). 
This analysis also permits an assessment of the 
outlook for China’s capital account if restrictions 
on capital ﬂ  ows were to be lifted.
Acemoglu et al (2005) develop a framework 
where differences in economic institutions 
are an important determinant of differences in 
economic development. Economic institutions 
include the structure of property rights and the 
presence and perfection of markets. Property 
rights provide the incentives to invest in 
physical and human capital or to adopt efﬁ  cient 
technologies. Property rights and the mere 
presence of markets, together with no or limited 
frictions and distortions, contribute to an 
efﬁ  cient allocation of resources. The absence 
of markets, on the other hand, prevents society 
at large from reaping the beneﬁ  ts of trade and 
generates a misallocation of resources. In 
recent years, China has witnessed a progressive 
move from a planned and centralised economy 
to a market and decentralised economy. This 
transition has stimulated factor accumulation, 
innovation and a more efﬁ  cient allocation of 
resources.
Understanding the determinants of economic 
institutions is a key factor in determining 
economic development in a country. In 
Acemoglu et al (2005), the state variables that 
determine the evolution of economic institutions 
and, ultimately, economic performance are
i) political institutions and ii) the distribution of 
resources. Although they are changing slowly, 
these state variables are not crystallised. In fact, 
they are endogenous to the system. Political 
institutions originate de jure political power. 
The distribution of resources determines de facto 
political power. The de jure and de facto political 
power, in turn, affect the choice of economic 
institutions and inﬂ   uence the evolution of 
political institutions themselves, which explains 
their endogeneity. Economic institutions shape 
the economic performance of a country, its rate 
of growth, the future distribution of resources 
and therefore the future de facto political power. 
Therefore economic institutions are endogenous 
since they are determined by the political 
institutions and the distribution of resources.
In the behaviour of the system described by 
Acemoglu et al (2005), there is a tendency 
towards persistence. Political institutions 
determine who holds the de jure political 
power, and the group that holds it tries to shape 
the evolution of the political institutions to 
ensure that it will continue to maintain its hold. 
Similarly, those who hold the de facto power 
push for economic and political institutions that 
ensure the status quo.50
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Chinese history since World War II (and perhaps 
before) can be interpreted within the framework 
proposed by Acemoglu et al (2005). In 1949, at 
the end of the civil war, the Communist Party 
seized power in China. Land holdings were 
forcibly taken from landlords and wealthier 
peasants and redistributed to poorer peasants. 
The redistribution process generated a major 
debate within the Communist Party. The radical 
faction led by Mao Zedong prevailed. 
Collectivisation was proposed, followed by a 
number of reforms that aimed to give the 
government control of agriculture. The ultimate 
goal of the plan, also known as the “Little Leap 
Forward,” was to ﬁ   nance industrialisation in 
then rural China. This phase of nationalisation 
and collectivisation was characterised by the 
creation of a series of highly centralised 
economic and political institutions with a strong 
de jure power. The process resulted in economic 
failure, and widespread famine followed in 
1956. Upon completion of the ﬁ  rst Five-Year 
Economic Plan in 1957, which was modelled on 
the experience of the Soviet Five-Year Plan by 
Stalin, Mao Zedong started to doubt that the 
socialist Soviet paradigm was appropriate for 
China.24 These developments cost Mao Zedong 
his credibility and a de facto reduction in his 
inﬂ  uence within the central government.
The economic failure of the planned-centralised 
system, its unmanageability for an economy in 
transition from a rural to an industrialised model, 
and its inherent lack of incentives generated 
waves of “administrative decentralisation” from 
the central to local governments and, to a lesser 
extent, to state-owned enterprises (see, for 
instance, Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995). 
The Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural 
Revlution in 1970 are the ﬁ  rst two examples of 
this decentralisation. The Great Leap Forward, 
which instituted giant cooperatives, disrupted 
market mechanisms and again resulted in 
economic disaster, bringing starvation between 
1960 and 1961. This favoured the emergence of 
more pragmatic economic policies, which were 
especially supported by the State President Liu 
Shaoqi and the Party General Secretary Deng 
Xiaoping. In 1966 Mao Zedong responded 
by launching political attacks against the 
pragmatists, which culminated with the Cultural 
Revolution in 1970. In essence, both the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
can be interpreted as Mao Zedong’s actions, 
designed to weaken centralised institutions 
and ultimately regain power. Owing to the 
weakening of centralised institutions, in a sense 
the Cultural Revolution paved the way for 
economic liberalisation and de-centralisation in 
the economy. When Den Xiaoping took power 
in 1978, ﬁ  lling the political vacuum left after 
the arrest of the Gang of Four, he had limited 
de facto power. To consolidate his position 
and gain popular support, he promoted a wave 
of liberalisation and assigned more power to 
local governments in an attempt to raise the 
population’s standard of living, which had badly 
deteriorated under Mao Zedong (who had died 
in September 1976). Over time, the resulting 
economic boom in China has shifted power 
to an emerging entrepreneurial middle class, 
especially in the costal cities of the country.
In China, the need to lift millions of people out 
of poverty has led to reforms encouraging forms 
of market economy, which include increased 
international openness (incentives to FDI are an 
example). This process has redistributed 
economic resources and modiﬁ  ed the balance of 
the de facto political power in Chinese society, 
and is ultimately generating a change in the 
economic institutions. The recent law giving 
individuals the same legal protection over their 
property as the state is symbolic of the tension 
between the persistence of institutions and the 
shift in the de facto power to the emerging 
middle class. The bill was unusually contentious 
and, although it was supposed to be passed in 
1996, was delayed due to internal resistance. 
The anxiety of the middle class to secure its 
In a famous speech in 1956 (“On ten important relationships”),  24 
Mao Zedong argued that “Our territory is so vast, our population 
is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better 
to have the initiatives come from both the central and the local 
authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the 
example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the 
hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities 
and denying them the right to independent action” (see, for 
example, Lin, Tao and Liu, 2003).51
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CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
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property and its need to become more assertive 
are prevailing. The communist party decision to 
enact the law is indicative of the ongoing shift 
in power.25
In the framework of Acemoglu et al (2005), 
the ongoing shift in the de facto political power 
in China is leading to changes in economic 
institutions. However, it is difﬁ  cult to ascertain 
when China will be able to fully protect 
domestic and foreign investors and create 
efﬁ  cient (ﬁ  nancial) markets. The process will 
take time since different economic institutions 
imply a different distribution of resources. 
This will typically result in a conﬂ  ict among 
different groups over the choice of economic 
institutions. If property rights are going to be 
fully guaranteed and market forces allowed to 
operate completely freely (implying the removal 
of barriers to capital movements), China will be 
in a position to contribute to a globally efﬁ  cient 
allocation of resources, supply “enough” reliable 
ﬁ   nancial instruments and attract capital from 
the rest of the world, possibly becoming a net 
international borrower. On the other hand, if the 
quality of Chinese institutions does not improve, 
the country may still continue to receive FDI 
(especially if one takes into account its large 
pool of cheap labour and if pro-FDI policies are 
perpetrated) but its appetite for store of value 
instruments will mainly be satisﬁ  ed  abroad, 
which will continue to result in a net capital 
outﬂ  ow.
In line with this discussion, Dollar and Kray 
(2006) forecast that in 20 years China will be 
a net debtor with a negative net foreign asset 
position. The authors argue that China already 
possesses “a low capital-labour ratio, reasonably 
good economic institutions and high returns on 
private investments”. Therefore market forces 
should push towards signiﬁ  cant net inﬂ  ows of 
capital. “As China continues its reforms and 
liberalises its ﬁ   nancial system, including the 
capital account, a signiﬁ   cant amount of the 
world’s wealth is going to want to move to this 
attractive location.”
Interestingly, according to ofﬁ  cial Chinese data (see the Blue  25 
Book of China’s Society, 2004) 30% of the registered private 
entrepreneurs were members of the Communist Party in 2004, 
compared with only 13% in 1993. Furthermore, 90% out of 
this 30% were already members of the Communist Party before 
becoming private entrepreneurs.52
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Considerations about efﬁ   cient allocation of 
capital, economic growth and risk-sharing 
suggest that market forces – and not 
administrative controls – will gradually have to 
become the main driver of capital ﬂ  ows  in 
China. The question is how to manage the 
transition from the current situation to a fully 
liberalised capital account. China could maintain 
restrictions to capital movements as long as it is 
necessary to meet some threshold conditions in 
ﬁ  nancial development. A recent study by Kose 
et al (2006) shows that capital account 
liberalisation is beneﬁ  cial to economic growth, 
especially for those economies above key 
thresholds related to the level of development of 
domestic  ﬁ   nancial markets, the quality of 
institutions and certain standards in corporate 
governance.26 In addition to meeting these 
threshold levels, reforms of exchange rate 
regimes are also called for, since capital account 
openness does not reconcile well with a pegged 
currency. Although there is no doubt that, in the 
long run, market forces should be the main 
determinant of the exchange rate and capital 
ﬂ  ows, it is crucial that reforms of the capital 
account and foreign exchange market are 
correctly sequenced to avoid massive speculative 
capital ﬂ  ows.
Without implementing effective domestic 
ﬁ  nancial liberalisation, capital account openness 
would simply provide new excessive risk-taking 
opportunities to banks and non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Although there is scant empirical 
evidence supporting the view that ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation is responsible for the spate of 
ﬁ  nancial crises over the last three decades (see, 
for instance, Kose et al, 2006), experience 
shows that ignoring issues related to currency 
risk and debt maturity mismatches leaves 
core institutions vulnerable to systemic risks. 
Massive capital inﬂ  ows could lead to excessive 
credit expansion from the domestic banking 
system, exposure of banks to asset market 
speculation, mismatches between assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheets, and currency 
speculation via the off-shore markets. The past 
ﬁ  nancial crises of the 1990s show that adequate 
reforms and the establishment of robust core 
institutions are essential in order to avoid these 
issues. In China, capital controls have sheltered 
the still immature ﬁ  nancial system, where the 
banking sector lacks the know-how to manage 
the foreign exchange risk properly. Capital 
inﬂ  ows in the banking system could generate 
a misallocation of resources, especially in an 
economy where credit is politically controlled 
and bail out is guaranteed, leaving ample room 
for moral hazard. Moreover, capital controls 
can also prevent the corporate sector from over-
borrowing from the foreign ﬁ  nancial system.
In addition to reforms intended to improve 
ﬁ  nancial developments and institutions, capital 
account openness requires a more ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate regime. A ﬁ  xed exchange rate, 
combined with capital account openness, 
has been an important ingredient of many 
recent b.o.p. crises. Well-known examples are 
provided by the crises in Latin America and 
South East Asia in the 1990s. In the case of 
Asia, despite relatively sound fundamentals and 
macroeconomic policies, the ﬁ  nancial crisis of 
1997 erupted because of the structure of the 
external position of the affected economies. 
After opening their capital accounts, the 
composition of capital that these countries 
received was tilted towards short-term debt 
mostly denominated in foreign currency. 
Currency, as well as asset and liability maturity 
mismatches on the external balance sheets, and 
expectations of a worsening of the repayment 
capacity of the affected economies triggered 
a run on the currency and then the crisis. 
Although China is sheltered from speculative 
attacks on account of its large amount of 
foreign reserves, this experience highlights the 
dangers of opening up the capital account in the 
presence of a ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime.
Kose et al (2006) highlight that, in addition to traditional  26 
channels, the beneﬁ  ts  of  ﬁ   nancial globalisation are realised 
through a set of “collateral beneﬁ  ts”, which include ﬁ  nancial 
market development, better institutions and governance, and 
macroeconomic discipline.53
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However, the adoption of a completely free-
ﬂ   oating exchange rate is premature in China 
at the current juncture, as long as its security 
markets remain narrow and shallow and the 
banking system weak and lacking adequate 
hedging instruments. In such circumstances, 
high volatility of the exchange rate may 
undermine the consistency of a monetary policy 
targeting domestic price stability. Short-term 
volatility and medium-term misalignment of the 
exchange rate under a free ﬂ  oat will also impede 
sustained external trade performance in China.
An intermediate exchange rate regime between 
the current ﬁ   xed and a possible free-ﬂ  oating 
regime could be a currency basket system. The 
central rate would then be linked to a basket of 
major currencies, including the US dollar, the 
Japanese yen and the euro, thereby reducing 
large ﬂ  uctuations in the single currency-based 
exchange rate regime. A wide band around 
a central rate could also be introduced to 
prevent the differences between expectations 
of appreciation (or depreciation) and interest 
rates differentials from triggering capital 
inﬂ  ows (outﬂ  ows) and make speculators realise 
(almost) certain proﬁ  ts. This system, combined 
with capital account openness would allow 
the authorities to maintain a certain degree of 
monetary independence targeting domestic price 
stability. At the same time, extreme short-term 
volatility and medium-term misalignment of 
the exchange rate could be alleviated. Although 
such exchange rate arrangements would increase 
the short-term variance of the renminbi against 
major currencies when compared with the 
current ﬁ  xed regime, it would both encourage 
hedging practices and discourage one-way bets 
on currency movements.
In this context, the most signiﬁ  cant risk facing 
China is that speculative capital (or the so-
called “hot money”) inﬂ  ows would likely rise 
signiﬁ   cantly if capital account restrictions 
were fully lifted, driven by the widely held 
expectation of a renminbi appreciation. This 
would lead to a reverse speculative attack on 
the currency, involving a massive buying of 
renminbi assets and increased pressures for 
currency appreciation. The monetary authority 
would then face a trade-off between maintaining 
the peg at the cost of diverting monetary policy 
away from domestic objectives and letting 
the renminbi ﬂ   oat. In the current juncture of 
weak institutions, a fully ﬂ  oating  exchange 
rate regime may lead to excessive volatility 
and overshooting, which in turn can affect the 
sectors most exposed to exchange rate risks, 
such as exporting manufacture, and those with 
the lowest productivity, such as agriculture. 
The impact would be exacerbated by the lack of 
sophisticated hedging instruments.
These arguments underscore the importance of 
a correct sequencing of reforms of the capital 
account and foreign exchange market 
liberalisation. If capital markets were liberalised 
ﬁ  rst, it is highly probable that there would be 
large speculative capital inﬂ  ows in expectation 
of a large appreciation of the renminbi.27 
Therefore, China should ﬁ  rst allow the exchange 
rate to reach a credible equilibrium level, while 
gradually opening the capital account. However, 
in order to have a well-functioning and efﬁ  cient 
foreign exchange market, capital markets should 
also be free from administrative controls and the 
capital account should be more open. This 
analysis suggests that reforms on both foreign 
exchange and capital markets should proceed in 
tandem. From this point of view, it is quite 
disconcerting that, in order to ease appreciation 
pressures on the renminbi, the authorities have 
recently taken action to open up the capital 
account to allow greater capital outﬂ  ows.
However, the possibility cannot be ruled out 
that capital ﬂ   ight may occur if the current 
expectations of a renminbi appreciation fade 
over time, given the backwardness of the 
Chinese ﬁ  nancial system, where a large portion 
of  ﬁ   nancial wealth is held in bank deposits 
yielding very low returns.
In Section 2.7, the discussion about forward markets and short- 27 
term portfolio considerations suggests that currently there 
are appreciation pressures on the renminbi that, in turn, may 
lead to speculative capital inﬂ   ows in the event of ﬁ  nancial 
liberalisation.54
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The ﬁ  nal question that we address in this section 
concerns an assessment about long-term capital 
movements in the event that the capital account 
in China becomes fully open. Our interest lies 
particularly in understanding whether the ﬁ  ve 
stylised facts characterising the China’s i.i.p. (see 
Section 5) could change if the capital account 
opens up. If the ongoing reforms substantially 
improve the quality of local institutions, China’s 
net foreign asset position may turn negative 
(i.e. China becomes a net borrower), its share 
of FDI may no longer be predominant in the 
total amount of liabilities, the accumulation 
of foreign reserves will come to an end (with 
possibly even a decrease) and assets held abroad 
by residents will be recorded through the ofﬁ  cial 
channels. On the other hand, if institutions are 
not improved sufﬁ  ciently, China will probably 
continue to be a net lender to the rest of the 
world and its foreign capital composition will 
remain more or less unaffected.55
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China’s currency peg to the US dollar has been 
an essential monetary anchor for internal price 
stability. However, monetary stability comes 
at the risk of undermining ﬁ  nancial stability in 
the long run. Over time, the peg has contributed 
to a massive accumulation of foreign reserves, 
which has led to a liquidity overhang in the 
ﬁ  nancial system and a credit boom. Excessive 
credit provision fuels overinvestment, which 
may ultimately lead to deﬂ  ation and rising non-
performing loans, with detrimental consequences 
for the stability of the domestic banking system. 
The authorities are fending off these risks by 
(partly) sterilising foreign exchange reserves 
and imposing administrative controls on bank 
lending. However, these controls imply a de 
facto transfer of the sterilisation costs off the 
balance sheet of the central bank and onto the 
balance sheet of the banking system, which 
raises concerns for bank proﬁ  tability.
The peg is undesirable and may become 
unsustainable in the long run. The Chinese 
authorities recognise the necessity to regain 
monetary independence (see, for instance, the 
2006 IMF Article IV). However, managing 
the transition from a pegged to a free-ﬂ  oating 
exchange rate regime is not simple. A correct 
sequencing of reforms is essential to allow 
greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility and, at the same 
time, a gradual liberalisation of capital account 
movements (see also Prasad et al, 2005).
Opening the capital account poses a number 
of questions. Contrary to the predictions of the 
neoclassical theory, according to which China 
should be a net capital borrower, the country 
is in fact a net supplier of capital to the rest of 
the world. However, if domestic institutions 
gradually improve, China may become a net 
capital borrower. Institutions are endogenous 
to society and reﬂ  ect tensions among different 
interest groups with possibly conﬂ  icting goals. 
This implies that institutions change over time, 
with implications for the economic performance 
of a country. This paper studies how institutions 
in China have evolved in response to the 
emergence of different interest groups, their 
impact on the economic performance of 
the country and the interactions between 
the economic outcome and the institutions 
themselves. Ultimately, reforms in the exchange 
rate regime and the capital account will depend 
on which interest group eventually prevails in 
the Chinese society.56
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APPENDIX
Table 5 Foreign assets and liabilities
(USD billions)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
FDI assets  -0.3 0.4 3.5 4.0 7.6 11.1 14.1 17.7 21.6
Portfolio investment, assets  0.0 0.1 1.2 1.7 2.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 5.1
Other investment, assets  12.4 24.7 35.7 39.3 42.9 47.0 50.8 51.1 52.4
Gross international reserves  3.1 13.2 30.2 44.3 21.2 23.0 53.6 76.0 107.7
Total assets 15.2 38.4 70.6 89.4 73.8 84.2 122.0 148.9 186.8
FDI liabilities  1.1 4.0 16.2 18.8 29.9 59.7 86.5 137.5 185.7
-   Debt-creating liabilities to foreign direct 
investors 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.0 5.4
-   Net foreign direct investment, excluding 
debt-creating liabilities  1.1 4.0 16.2 18.8 29.9 59.7 85.4 134.5 180.2
Portfolio investment, liabilities  0.0 0.9 5.1 5.6 6.0 9.7 13.6 14.3 16.7
-   Debt securities  0.0 0.9 5.1 5.6 6.0 9.7 13.6 14.3 16.7
-   Equity securities  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other investment, liabilities  8.7 14.9 47.5 54.9 63.3 73.9 78.1 89.3 94.2
-   Net external borrowing from commercial 
banks 4.0 7.9 22.4 25.6 28.4 34.6 38.0 43.4 47.2
-   Liabilities to ofﬁ  cial creditors  1.9 5.6 11.2 12.4 15.8 19.7 27.4 31.8 33.8
-   Other liabilities (incl. trade credits, other 
loans, and currency and deposits)  2.8 8.2 4.6 4.7 -5.3 -14.0 -24.0 -29.3 -33.7
-   Exchange rate valuation effects on debt 
stock 0.0 0.2 14.6 18.4 23.1 31.9 37.1 40.2 34.4
-   Discrepancy between debt stock and 
cumulated debt ﬂ  ows  0.0 -7.1 -5.3 -6.2 1.3 1.7 -0.5 3.2 12.5
Other liabilities  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total liabililties 9.8 19.8 68.8 79.4 99.3 143.3 178.2 241.1 296.5
NFA 5.4 18.6 1.8 10.0 -25.5 -59.1 -56.2 -92.2 -109.7
Unrecorded assets abroad  0.5 -9.3 -8.4 -5.5 31.2 41.4 49.0 70.6 95.3
-   Cumulative error and omissions  -1.2 0.1 7.5 14.3 22.5 32.4 42.1 60.0 75.5
-   Valuation changes on ofﬁ  cial reserves stock  1.7 -2.3 -10.6 -13.6 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
-   Valuation changes on debt stock  0.0 -7.1 -5.3 -6.2 1.3 1.7 -0.5 3.2 12.557
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ANNEXE
Table 5 Foreign assets and liabilities (USD billions)
(USD billions)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
FDI assets  25.8 29.8 29.9 30.9 39.1 40.7 37.9 38.7 49.9 67.0
Portfolio investment, assets  6.7 11.8 25.3 32.8 47.8 50.1 63.0 64.9 96.7 204.4
Other investment, assets  86.4 121.4 145.8 189.7 168.9 171.9 189.9 187.9 236.8 258.3
Gross international reserves  143.4 149.8 158.3 168.9 216.3 292.0 409.2 615.5 822.5 1,062.5
Total assets 262.2 312.9 359.4 422.2 472.1 554.8 699.8 907.0 1,205.9 1,592.2
FDI liabilities  231.3 270.0 299.0 328.5 366.0 406.6 449.2 509.6 585.9 662.2
-   Debt-creating liabilities to foreign direct 
investors 9.9 13.2 15.6 17.7 21.3 26.3 32.0 40.4 48.2 56.7
-   Net foreign direct investment, excluding 
debt-creating liabilities  221.5 256.7 283.4 310.9 344.7 380.3 417.2 469.2 537.8 605.5
Portfolio investment, liabilities  24.5 24.4 24.9 36.4 31.9 30.0 40.5 49.2 67.8 172.7
-   Debt securities  18.9 18.2 16.9 10.2 10.6 10.1 10.8 13.1 14.0 14.0
-   Equity securities  5.7 6.3 8.1 26.2 21.3 19.9 29.7 36.1 53.8 158.7
Other investment, liabilities  102.2 114.6 119.3 117.9 152.9 150.0 165.9 194.0 218.9 254.2
-   Net external borrowing from commercial 
banks  54.4 57.2 54.8 47.6 48.0 49.0 53.7 65.3 79.2 91.4
-   Liabilities to ofﬁ  cial creditors  34.9 40.3 46.6 45.9 46.2 47.0 46.8 58.3 72.1 84.1
-   Other liabilities (incl. trade credits, other 
loans, and currency and deposits)  -24.0 -40.8 -38.4 -18.1 -22.7 -25.6 -18.1 -5.3 12.0 21.8
-   Exchange rate valuation effects on debt 
stock  29.6 25.8 29.2 29.9 25.3 24.9 28.9 32.5 31.9 29.4
-   Discrepancy between debt stock and 
cumulated debt ﬂ  ows  7.3 32.1 27.1 12.7 56.2 54.7 54.6 43.1 23.7 27.6
Other liabilities  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 3.8 7.6
Total liabililties 358.1 409.0 443.2 482.6 550.6 586.4 655.4 752.5 876.4 1,096.7
NFA -95.9 -96.1 -83.8 -60.4 -78.5 -31.6 44.5 154.5 329.5 495.5
Unrecorded assets abroad  124.1 167.7 177.4 174.9 223.2 213.7 195.1 156.5 153.9 167.8
-   Cumulative error and omissions  109.4 128.2 143.0 154.9 159.7 151.9 133.5 106.5 123.2 133.2
-   Valuation changes on ofﬁ  cial reserves stock  7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0
-   Valuation changes on debt stock  7.3 32.1 27.1 12.7 56.2 54.7 54.6 43.1 23.7 27.658
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